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I. THE ORIGINS OF THE LEGISLATION
Ontario's legislation relating to financing of political
campaigns was enacted for several reasons, but perhaps the most

important

are the suspicions

of corruption which

followed

Conservative party fund raisers.
Canada is a country where
allegations of corrupt practices by big business have never been far
from the surface,1 and historically Ontario was no exception to this
feature of national politics. In 1966 a member of the provincial
legislature demanded an investigation into allegations that a
Conservative party fund raiser gave the impression to representatives
of Melchers Distillers Ltd that he might be able to influence the
Liquor Control Board of Ontario on behalf of the Company.2 Not
long after the 1963 election in relation to which the allegation was

made, there was a general increase in liquor prices. It was alleged
the Canadian distillers, including Melchers, who contributed to the
Conservatives' election fund recovered their investment within a few
months; as a result, Ontario consumers indirectly defrayed a part of
the election expenses of the Conservatives. 3 The provincial Premier
denied that there was any truth in the allegations, and he rejected
calls for an independent judicial inquiry. But the allegations clearly
wounded the Tory establishment. The Premier gave an undertaking
that a Select Committee would be appointed
"to carry out a
4
system."
electoral
our
of
complete study
It was over six years, however, before any serious
investigation into campaign financing took place. The Conservative
government only took action as a result of another charge of
corruption. In 1972, it was claimed in the Legislature that a
government contract to build a new Workman's Compensation
Building was awarded to a corporation in return for a donation of

1 For an account, see Z.K. Paltiel, PoliticalParyFinancingit Canada (Toronto: McGrawHill Co., 1970).
2 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates: Official Report, 4th Sess., 27th Leg. (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1966) (24 March 1966) cols. 1861-2513.
3 Ibid, cols. 2510-13.
4 Ibid, col. 2513.
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fifty thousand dollars to Conservative party funds.5 In response to
this affair, the government referred the matter to the Camp
Commission, which had been set up in June 1972 to study the

functions of the Legislative Assembly, with particular reference to
the role of private members and how their participation in the

process of government could be enlarged. In referring this
additional matter of party and election campaign financing to the
Commission, the Premier said:
To the greatest extent possible, I would want to maintain a political system in
which the various parties can function and campaign for public support freely and
openly and6 ... in an atmosphere above and beyond public doubt, suspicion or
cynicism....

Whether or not there was any truth in the allegations which had
been made was to some extent irrelevant:
... the Watergate scandal to the South, and some public questioning of relationships
between the government and individuals in the private sector in Ontario had led to
widespread concern regarding the morality of the political process, and the risk that
large corporations which regularly donated major sums to governing parties, could
be in a position to unduly influence government. In order to ensure in the
ordinary citizen confidence that his participation in the political process was in fact
meaningful, it7was essential that Ontario election financing legislation be accepted
and enforced.

A. The Camp Commission Recommendations
general
Commission
made
three
The
Camp
recommendations. First, it gave a muted attack on the traditional
practice in the political system not to disclose either the source of
party funds or the disposition of them. In a remarkable passage

See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates: Official Report, 2d Sess., 29th Leg.
(Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1972) (17 March 1972) col. 533; (21 November 1972) col. 4705;
(6 December 1972) cols. 5257-58; (12 December 1972) col. 5489; and (December 1972) cols.
5503-04.
6 Ontario, Commission on the Legislature, Third Report (Toronto: The Commission, 1974)
at 3 (Chairman: Dalton Camp) [hereinafter the Camp Report].
7 Ontario, Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, The Commission: Ten
years later,1975-1985: Reflections on PoliticalFinancingin Ontario (Toronto: The Commission,
1985) at 3.
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about the common practice in a modern liberal democracy, the
Commission noted that "it would be difficult to make even an
informed guess as to the total sums raised annually in Canada by
politicians and parties......8 Second, the Commission reiterated the
need to ensure that the parties had sufficient funds: "In any system
close to the ideal, a political party with a reasonable base of public
support ought to have adequate funds so that it can maintain an
efficient level of research, organization and communications capacity
between elections, and campaign effectively during elections." 9 The
third recommendation of the Commission was to reduce the
dependence of the parties on institutional support and to extend the
popular base of party financing:
... there is too little genuine incentive for the party to give proper emphasis to the
smaller contributor, or to broaden the base of party financing. A free, open, and
democratic political system ought to have a greater reliance upon general public
support and ought not to depend, for its continuance, on the generosity of a
segment of the community. Certainly, when political parties rightfully have their
influence upon Members in the Legislature, the parties themselves cannot be
of the risk of undue or disproportionate influence of those who
deemed to be free
10
pay their bills....

As a means to achieve these goals, the Commission
considered but rejected two proposed methods, each of which has
been adopted in Canada or elsewhere. The first proposal was for
large scale public funding of political parties. The Commission
rejected this method for three reasons: (1) if money was to be
apportioned according to political success, it would discriminate in
favour of the "ins" against the "outs;"11 (2) if all parties were to be
treated in the same way, this would favour minority parties at the
expense of major ones;12 (3) and finally, this method would present
a dilemma in respect of independent candidates - they would either
have to prohibited altogether or financed even if there was
suspicion they were "seeking notoriety or self-aggrandizement ... at
8 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 2.

9 Ibid at 5.
10 Ibid at 6.
11 Ibid at 9-11.
12 Ibid. at 10.
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public expense."13 The Commission instead recommended striking
a balance between private contributions and public funding by
encouraging the parties to broaden their base by going out to
organize support. To facilitate this it recommended the introduction
of a tax credit system for political donations.1 4 In addition, the
Commission made the further recommendation that a limited
reimbursement from public funds should be made to candidates for
election in order to help ensure that credible candidates may mount
However, no public funding was
credible campaigns. 1 5
recommended for the parties; the extent of the state's contribution
was limited to the encouragement of private political donations
through the tax credit. The parties would have to work for funding
and would be rewarded in a manner genuinely commensurate with
their popular support.
The second method rejected by Camp was a limit on
campaign expenditure. Such a step had been taken at the federal
level in 1974,16 shortly before the Camp Commission reported. But
the Commission was not tempted to follow the Federal Act 17 and
claimed to find serious flaws in it.18 First, Camp claimed that the
absence of limits on the amount which individuals or corporations
could donate to parties would "leave the method of political
financing relatively unchanged, with the parties continuing their
traditional dependence on the traditional sources for their funds."
Second, Camp was concerned that spending limits were
unenforceable and impracticable. One particular problem was how
to assess the commercial value of services rendered to the party or
13 Ibid

14 Ibid. at 11, 32-35.
15 Ibid. at 40.
16 Election Expenses Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 51.
17 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 14-18.
18 It is to be noted, however, that one of the three Commissioners, Mr. Farquhar Oliver,
wrote a note of dissent in which he expressed his "full agreement with the recommendations
of this Report, with the qualification that there should have been a recommendation for
ceilings on party and constituency expenditure in an election campaign. This would ... have
added materially to the full effect of our proposals" Introductory letter to the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly, the Honourable Russell D. Rowe.
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its candidates in a campaign. This was particularly troublesome in
the case of volunteers who contribute some special expertise to the
campaign:
No one who has had experience with campaigning will underestimate the value of
such a contribution; on the other hand, the mind boggles at the task of those who

must record the particulars of all this, and put a fair market price on it for the
purpose of calculating campaign expenses./9

A third problem with campaign expenses limits is that pure
equality could never be achieved because of the inordinate
advantage which governing parties have during election campaigns
"in terms of being able to utilize the services of countless ministerial
assistants, secretaries, researchers, and other public employees, to
say nothing of the transportation and communications systems at
20
their disposal.
But although critical of general campaign spending limits, the
Camp Commission was nevertheless concerned that campaigns were
becoming too costly.21 It claimed, however, that there were more
effective ways of limited spending and singled out two in
particular.22 These were to shorten the length of election
campaigns and to reduce the number of days on which the parties
could campaign on the media. But the main recommendation of
the Commission was for the introduction of limits on the size of
contributions which could be made to the parties by individuals,
trade unions, or corporations. In order to terminate "the substantial
dependence of ...
political parties upon the substantial contributions

of a few"23 and "to remove from the political process the presence

19 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 17.

20 Ibid. Camp also contended that there "are great difficulties with the enforcement of
ceilings on expenditures...." The Report continues by contending that "margins of error must
be allowed, leading inevitably to permissiveness and then to inevitable carelessness and

indifference. The enforcement of spending ceilings requires exacting reporting standards and
thorough auditing, and demands of constituency organizations, a competence that few of them
in fact can be assumed to have." Ibid. at 43.

21 Ibid. at 19.
22 ibid.
23 Ibid. at 31.
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of big money from large and powerful interests,"24 the Committee
recommended that a maximum of two thousand dollars could be
donated by any individual, union, or corporation in any one year to
a party.25 Small, additional sums could be donated to constituency
associations, and in an election year the size of the contribution
could be doubled.
These provisions, it was claimed, would
guarantee to the parties adequate means relative to the public
support they enjoyed. Together with the public-funding proposals,
they would further ensure that at least a minimum amount would be
available to all candidates who managed to attract a fixed
26
percentage of the popular vote - Camp recommended 15 percent.
One further point of note is that Camp recommended that only
parties registered with a specially created 27independent Commission
would be legally able to solicit donations.
This last recommendation was an important one.
Throughout, Camp had been aware of the difficulty of enforcing
legislation of this kind. In fact, one of his objections to the federal
legislation, in addition to those already discussed, was the total lack
of enforcement machinery:
It seems to us that the totality of experience with legislation dealing with political
parties and elections suggests that no satisfactory degree of compliance is possible
if the parties are left to police one another, or
where enforcement is the reluctant
8
responsibility of the Chief Electoral Officer.

The Report continued by asserting that
no attempt at reform is possible ... unless the parties, contributors and supporters
alike have reason to be convinced that the regulations governing their activities are
certain to be enforced. 2 9

Camp consequently recommended that the proposed Commission
should be clothed with power and authority to enforce legislation.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. at 33.
26 Ibid. at 40.
27

Ibid. at 28.

28 Ibid. at 15.
29 Ibid.
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Registration of all parties, constituency associations, and candidates
for election to the Provincial Legislature would be required. In
addition, parties would have to disclose the source of their
the Commission audited
contributions, and annually file with
30
statements of receipts and expenses.
II. THE ELECTION FINANCES REFORM ACT 1975
Legislation to give effect to the recommendations of the
Camp Commission was introduced in 1975 with the Election
FinancesRefon Act.3 1 The Act introduced limits on contributions
to political parties; limits on advertising by candidates and parties
during an election campaign; a public subsidy for candidates in an
election; and a system of registration of parties together with the
reporting of contributions from individuals, corporations, and trade
unions. The Act was to be enforced by a nine member Commission
on Election Contributions and Expenses. Six members were to be
nominated by the three major political parties, two by each party;
the three other members were to be a bencher of the Law Society
of Upper Canada appointed by the Lieutenant Governor, the Chief
Election Officer for Ontario, and a chairman appointed by the
Lieutenant Governor for up to ten years. 32 All the members of the
Commission were forbidden, during their tenure of office, to be
members of the Assembly, candidates at an election, officers in a
political party, or contributors to a political party.33 The Act,
therefore, implemented all of the major recommendations of the
Camp Commission.

30 Ibid. at 23-30.
31 R.S.O. 1975, c. 134.
32 Ibid., s. 2.
33 Ibid., s. 2(6).
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A. Registration
Under the Act only registered political parties could accept
contributions.3 4 The conditions of registration were very onerous
and effectively excluded a number of organizations from full
participation in the political life of the Province of Ontario.
Registration was available only if one of the following conditions
were satisfied: that the party held a minimum of four seats in the
Legislative Assembly following the most recent election after the Act
came into force; that the party nominated candidates in at least 50
percent of electoral districts in that election or in subsequent
elections; or, at any time other than during a campaign period, the
party provided the Commission with the names, addresses, and
signatures of ten thousand persons who were both eligible to vote
in an election and also attested to their registration in that political
party.35 In 1985, there were eight registered parties, three being
registered on the first of the methods outlined above (the
Progressive Conservatives, the Ontario Liberal Party, and Ontario
NDP); the remaining five parties were registered under the
petitioning procedure. These were the Communist Party of Canada
(Ontario), the Ontario Libertarian Party, the Northern Ontario
Heritage Party, the Freedom Party of Ontario, and the Green Party
of Ontario.3 6 There were another twenty-seven parties known to
the Commission which had not been registered because they had
not provided the necessary petition.3 7 One of these, the Nationalist

34 Ibid., s. 10.
35 Ibid., s. 10(2). When applying for registration a party must submit information
required by s. 10(3). This relates to matters such as the leader's name, the address, the name
of principal officers, and the name and address of the party's bank(s).
36 Ontario, Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, The Eleventh Annual
Report of the Commission on Election Contributionsand ExApenses for the year 1985 (Toronto:
The Commission, 1986) at 13-15 [hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report].
37 The other parties are: the Ontario Republican Party; Ontario Social Credit Party;
Unity Canada Party; Progressive Environmental Party of Ontario; the Moral Political Party;
Women's Party; The Detente Party of Canada; Feminist Party of Canada; The Enterprise
Party; Political Science Consensus Party of Ontario; the United Party of Canada; National
Unity Party; Self-Help Ontario Political Services; Christian Credit Party of Ontario;
Multiculturalism Party of Canada; World Wide Disarmament Party of Canada; Christian
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Party of Canada, submitted a petition in 1978, but the petition was
rejected by the Commission following complaints that people had
been improperly induced to sign it.38
In addition to parties, constituency associations were also
required to register with the Commission before they could accept
contributions.39 Both parties and constituency associations could be
deregistered by the Commission,4 0 though in the former case only
on application by the party concerned,41 and in the latter case only
on application by the party and the constituency association. 42 This
last provision imposed significant limitations on the power of the
parties centrally to manage or regulate the affairs of local parties.
It was not open to the party to use deregistration as a sanction and
to then register a newly created and newly staffed organization.
The Commission itself could initiate deregistration proceedings if
either a party or a constituency association 43 had failed to submit an
annual statement of assets and liabilities, together with receipts and
expenses.4 4 Deregistration might also be initiated where the party
or the constituency association failed to submit details or receipts
and expenses during an election campaign. 45 On deregistration, the
funds of the party of the constituency association would pass to the
Commission, 46 which would keep the funds to help defray its
Reform Party of Canada; the Social Credit Association of Ontario; the Humanist Party of
Ontario; Christian Ethics Party (CEP); the Anti-Abortion Party; Party for the Commonwealth

of Canada; Government by the People Party; For Better Future; the Cayenne Pepper Party
of Ontario; the New Ontario Party.

38 Ontario, The Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, The Fourth Annual
Report of the Commission on Election Contributionsand Expenses for the year 1978 (Toronto:
The Commission, 1978) at 5 [hereinafter Fourth Annual Report].
39 Supra, note 31 at 5-11.

40 Ibid., s. 14(1).
41 Ibid., s. 14(1)(a).
42 Ibid., s. 14(1)(b).
43 Ibid., s. 14(2).
44 Ibid., s. 42.
45 Ibid., s. 43.
46 Ibid., s. 14(7).
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expenses under the Act. 47 That was unless the party or the
association was re-registered within a period of two years from
deregistration, in which case the money would be returned. Finally,
it is to be noted that candidates for election were also required to
register as a condition of receiving funds for their respective
48
campaigns.
B. Contributions
By section 17 of the Act, contributions to registered political
parties, constituency associations, and candidates could be made only
by "persons individually, corporations and trade unions." The Act
also imposed limits on the size of the contributions from each of
these sources. No more than two thousand dollars could be
donated by any person, corporation, or union to each registered
party, and no more than five hundred dollars could be donated to
any registered constituency association by each of these contributors,
with a ceiling of two thousand dollars being set as an aggregate sum
which a single contributor could donate to the constituency
associations of a particular party.49 A single contributor, therefore,
could donate up to four thousand dollars per annum to a party and
constituency association of a party. In an election campaign a
further two thousand dollars could be donated to a registered party,
and a further five hundred dollars could be donated to a
constituency association, again with a ceiling of two thousand dollars
on such donationsSO
One weakness of any legal control of political contributions
and campaign spending is the potential for abuse and evasion. The
history of legal controls on party financing in both Canada and the

47

1bid.

48 Ibid., s. 15.
49 Ibid., s. 19(l)(a).
50 Ibid., s. 19(l)(b).
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United States is replete with examples of failure 51 The 1975 Act
addressed some of the deficiencies of legislation enacted in other
jurisdictions.
First, steps were taken to ensure that the reforms
were not undetermined by a wealthy candidate injecting vast
amounts of private resources into the campaign, by a provision that
any personal funds used by a candidate were to be deemed to be 52a
contribution and therefore subject to the controls outlined above.
Second, in order to prevent a wealthy individual dividing up a parcel
of money to be laundered through the contributions of a large
number of people, the Act provided that contributors were not to
contribute money not actually belonging to them,5 3 nor were they to
contribute funds that had been given or furnished for the purpose
of making a contribution.
This meant, for example, than an
employer could not divide a sum of money amongst his employees
so that they may then pass the money onto a political party. Third,
in order to regulate non-monetary, substantial donations in kind to
the political parties, the Act provided that the value of goods or
services given to a party were to be regarded as a contribution54 as
well as the value of any advertising undertaken to support a party
or candidate with their approval 55 A fourth method of regulation
was to ensure that fund-raising activities did not become a means
whereby the contribution limits were seriously breached either by
the anonymous collection of vast sums of money or by the
imposition of unrealistically high prices of admission to fund-raising
events. Through these provisions, the Act imposed a duty on
parties, constituency associations, and candidates to record and
report to the Commission the gross income from any fund-raising
function.5 6 For this purpose, a fund-raising function was defined as
For an account of Canadian developments, see Canada, Committee on Election
Expenses, Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966) at 13-

27 (Chairman: Alphonse Barbeau).
52 Supra, note 31, s. 19(3).
53 Ibid., s. 20.
54 Ibid., s. 22.
55 Ibid., s. 23.
56

Ibid., s. 24(2).
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suppers, dances, garden parties, or any other social function held for
the purpose of raising funds.5 7 In addition to the duty to report,
the Act treated any charge for admission to a fund-raising function
as a contribution 5 8 The party could deduct from the cost certain
reasonable expenses, though the most that could be claimed as an
expense for each individual was twenty-five dollars.59 Anything in
excess of this was regarded as a contribution. Where money was
collected at a political meeting by way of a general collection from
those present, the Act provided that no one could donate more than
five dollars. 60
Such donations were not to be treated as
contributions for the purpose of the Act, although the party,
constituency association, or candidate on whose behalf the money
was collected were under a duty to report to the Commission the
gross amount so collected. 61
A final regulation concerned loans to the registered parties.
If the parties were free to accept donations in the shape of
forgiveable "loans," the contribution limits would quickly be rendered
ineffective because individuals could actually contribute much more
than the statutory limits. It was to deal with this that section 37
provided that no party, constituency association, or candidate could
receive a loan from any person, corporation, or trade union. This
wide rule was qualified in only two ways. First, a loan could be
accepted from a registered political party or constituency
association. 62 This was designed to permit the transfer of money
from central parties to constituency associations or candidates to
help finance local campaigns.
The other exception was that a
party, constituency association, or candidate could borrow money

57 Ibid., s. 24(1).
58 Ibid., s. 24(3).

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., s. 25.

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., s. 37(2).
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from a chartered bank or other lending institution provided
that
63
details of all such loans were reported to the Commission.
C. Regulating Campaign Expenses
The only limitations on expenses which the Act introduced
were contained in sections 38 and 39 and related wholly to
expenditure in an election campaign. This provided that advertising
conducted for the purpose of promoting or opposing any party or
candidate could only be conducted in the three-week period
immediately preceding polling day, excluding the day before polling
day itself.64 This was meant to reduce election costs by making the
campaign period very short. It should be noted, however, that this
did not stop independent advocacy on behalf of the party or
candidate outside these time limits. A crucial qualification to the
limit on campaign spending is that it applied only to expenditures
incurred by the party or candidate, or by a person acting with its
knowledge and consent. 65 A number of minor qualifications were
also made to this prohibition on advertising. It did not apply, for
example, to the advertising of public meetings in constituencies or
to matters concerning the administrative function of constituen 6
associations such as announcements from association headquarters
In addition to this control over the duration of the campaign
period, the Act also introduced steps to ensure that different
candidates or parties were not denied effective access to the
electorate either because the broadcasting companies levied
discriminatory advertising charges or because one party was able to
dominate the election financially and so drown out the message of
the others. The first problem was dealt with by a requirement that
the broadcaster during the campaign period not charge any party or
candidate less than "the lowest rate charged by him ...
for an equal

63 Ibid., s. 36.
64 Ibid., s. 38(1).
65 Ibid., s.38().
66 Ibid.
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amount of equivalent time on the same facilities made available to
any other person in that period." 67 Similar provisions applied to
advertisements in periodical publications.68 In other words, there
was to be equal right of access to television, radio advertising, and
the press. The second problem of election campaigns, that of
unequal resources of the parties and candidates, was dealt with by
ceilings on expenses. 69 However, these were very limited and
applied only to expenses incurred by way of broadcasting or "by
publishing in any newspaper, magazine or other periodical
publication or by display through the use of any outdoor advertising
facility." Nationally, a party could spend twenty-five cents for every
voter on the electoral list; locally, constituency associations and
independent candidates could spend twenty-five cents for every voter
on the list for their respective electoral districts.
It is to be noted that just as there was no limit on
independent advocacy outside the official campaign period, neither
was there any limit on such advocacy during the campaign period.
It was thus open to a range of individuals or organizations to incur
expenditure in support of a candidate or party provided that it was
not done with the knowledge and consent of the party or candidate
concerned. This would clearly allow the businesses, for example, to
use their vast financial resources in an election campaign to support
a particular party or candidate. The danger for the parties is,
however, that they have no control over the groups which will
identify with their cause and which by their very support may do as
much to damage a party's chances as strengthen them.70 In
practice, however, this may not be a serious concern and may be
outweighed by the sheer volume of "safe" support from the business
community. One final point is worth noting about the promotional
activities of independent third parties. The limits on broadcasting
companies and the press did not apply here. This made it possible

67 Ibid., s. 38(4)(a).
68 Ibid., s. 38(4)(b).

69 Ibid., s. 39.
70 A point made forcefully by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1

(1976).
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for the media to charge prohibitively high fees for advertisements
promoting a party or candidate which were not supported by those
who owned or controlled the media service being used.
D. Public Funding
The Camp Commission had recommended the introduction
of two forms of public subsidy for the political parties. The first
was indirect in the sense that people who donated should be given
tax advantages. The proposals on this question took two forms.
First, the Commission recommended tax credits for donations by
individuals. Camp recommended "a tax credit of 75% on the first
$100, plus 50% on the next $450 plus 33 1/3% on the remainder to
a maximum credit of $500."71 Second, the Commission proposed
the more radical suggestion of a tax check off whereby "every
individual whose provincial income tax liability for the taxable year
is $2 or more" should "be allowed to designate $2 as a political
contribution to any registered provincial political party of the
individual's choice."72
This was proposed to increase the
involvement of citizens in the political process.
Thus, the
Commission concluded in its Report:
If the process of political financing is no longer to be underwritten by large

contributors, ways must be found to increase the number of individual contributors
so that the parties may continue to function effectively, proportionate to their
support.

We believe a mix of the tax check off, tax credits, and limited public

73
funding in campaigns can combine to achieve this.

74
In the end the tax credit was adopted by the government,
though the tax check off was not, Camp having rightly anticipated
"bureaucratic resistance" on the basis that "the check off creates a
further area for taxpayer confusion and makes further demands

71 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 32.

72 Ibid. at 39.
73 ]bid.
74 Income Tax Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 213, s. 7(6).
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upon the computers. '75 So far as tax credits for individual donations
are concerned, the legislation made provision roughly along the lines
proposed by Camp, that is to say,
(a) 75 per cent of the amount contributed if the amount
contributed does not exceed $100;
(b) $75 plus 50 per cent of the amount by which the amount
contributed exceeds $100 if the amount contributed exceeds
$100 and does not exceed $550; or
(c) the lesser of,
(i) $300 plus 33 1/3 per cent of the amount by which
the amount contributed exceeds $550 if the amount
contributed exceeds $550, and
(ii)

$500.76

So far as corporations are concerned, the Coiporation Tax Act was
also amended broadly along lines proposed by Camp. Thus, in each
tax year a corporation could deduct from its taxable income political
donations which did not "exceed the least of (i) the amount
contributed, (ii) [the corporation's] taxable income computed
without reference to this section, and (iii) $4,000."77 The legislation,
however, departed from the Camp recommendation in one
important respect. The amount deducted could not be doubled in
an election year, 78 although the corporation could in fact double the
amount of its contributions.
In addition to facilitating donations through the tax system,
a second form of public subsidy proposed by Camp was the making
Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 39. It has been explained that "the check off was
proposed and accepted by all parties in Ontario and accepted by the government of the day,
and that when that was put to Revenue Canada, they said technically they could not do it.
It is obvious, because of the householder tax credit and some of the other tax credits, that
they can do that kind of counting now because they do it. It would seem that the
impediment, which is the only impediment to the check off I have ever heard, does not exist
today and we could implement such a check off." Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing
Committee on Procedural Affairs. Evidence submitted by New Democratic Party at 27 (15
September 1982) (Afternoon Session) (Mr. I. Murray, Former Provincial Secretary).
76 Income Tax Act, supra, note 74.
77 CorporationsTax Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 97, s. 20.
78 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 33.
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of payments directly to candidates in an election to meet election
expenses. 79 But although the 1975 Act embraced this policy, it did
so by departing significantly from the Camp recommendations.
Camp had suggested that some limited form of public funding was
necessary
to help ensure that credible candidates may mount credible campaigns: to relieve
the pressing needs upon parties and candidates for campaign funds; and, as well

...
to give an incentive to candidates to manage their expenditures in the interests
of effectiveness and economy and to provide some deterrent to over-expenditure.

In order to pursue this last goal, the Commission had recommended
that the refund to each
candidate should not exceed seven thousand
80
dollars.
hundred
five
with the qualification that any candidate who spends more than the total of 800 for
each of the first 20,000 electors in his constituency, and 25¢ for each of the
remaining electors,8 1shall have his subsidy reduced by $1 for each $2 by which he
exceeds such total.

The 1975 Act did not in fact load the rebate against high
spenders.82 Under the Act every candidate who received at least
15 percent of the popular vote was entitled to reimbursement for
expenditure of up to an aggregate of sixteen cents for each of the
first twenty-five thousand voters in his or her electoral district, and
fourteen cents for each voter in excess of twenty-five thousand in
his or her electoral district.83 This open-ended commitment to
reimburse expenses met with some criticism. It was pointed out that
the absence of effective spending limits permitted candidates to
spend excessively and that high spenders were "being subsidized by
the people of Ontario through the rebated scheme provided for in

79 Ibid. at 40.
80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.
82 Supra, note 31, s. 45.
83 Ibid., s. 45(1).

The rebate determined under s. 45(1) is raised by $2,500 in six

electoral districts (Cochrane North, Rainy River, Kenora, Lake Nipigon, Algoma, and Nickel
Belt (s. 45(2)).
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the Act."84 The Liberal party claimed that if this was permitted to
continue, "only more and more cynicism about the political process
will develop."85 This concern seems to have been fuelled by
activities in one constituency in the 1981 provincial election where
the Conservative candidate raised $142,786 and spent $90,552,
compared with the second placed Liberal candidate who raised only
$6,981.86 Both candidates, however, received a subsidy of $5,902,87
which it was considered to be highly inappropriate and
irresponsible.88 It was charged that the money was being used to
help the candidate build up a war chest and that it was offensive to
subsidize people who were obviously "flush."
E. Enforcement
To encourage the parties, constituency associations, and
candidates to keep proper account of the contributions made to
them, the Act required that they all appoint a chief financial officer
(cFo). 89 The CFO's statutory duties were to ensure that proper
records were kept of all receipts and expenditures; that an annual
statement of assets, liabilities, receipts, and expenses was filed with
the Commission; and that a statement of receipts and expenses in a
campaign period was filed with the Commission. 90 In addition, the
CFO was under a duty to record all donations from a single source
in any year which exceeded ten dollars. Where this exceeded one
hundred dollars, the CFO was to record the name and address of the
84 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Procedural Affairs. Evidence

submitted by Mr. J.Evans, President of Ontario Liberal Party at 4 (15 September 1982).
85 Ibid.
86 Ontario, Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, The Seventh Annual
Report of the Conmission on Election Contributionsand&apensesfor the year 1981 (Toronto:
The Commission, 1982) at 68 [hereinafter Seventh Annual Report]. The Conservative
candidate was Lawrence S. Grossman.

87 Ibid.
88 Supra, note 84.
89 Supra, note 31, s. 34.

90 Ibid., s. 34(4).
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contributor. 91 This information was, in turn, to be filed with the
Commission annually and was made available for public constituency
by the Commission. 92 If the CFO of a political party, constituency
association, or candidate failed to submit an annual return or a
campaign period return, he or she was guilty of an offence and on
conviction could be fined one thousand dollars.93 Criminal penalty
was in fact the normal sanction employed in the statute, it being
provided that "every person, political party or constituency
association that contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, for
which contravention no penalty is otherwise provided, is guilty of an
94
offence."
Yet despite the use of the criminal law, the enforcement
mechanism was a potential weakness in the Act. First, the penalties
for any breach were very light. The maximum fine which could be
imposed on a party was two thousand dollars; on a constituency
association or candidate it was one thousand dollars; and on a
corporation or trade union it was ten thousand dollars.95 Second,
although prosecution was instituted only with the consent of the
Commission, 96 it could be done only after consultation with the
Attorney-General's Office.9 7 This was rightly criticized, 98 for it was

a major threat to the independence of the Commission. In practice,
however, the issue was not a live one, for no suggestion has been
made of any serious or systematic abuses, nor is there any evidence

91 Ibid., s. 35(1).

92 Ibid., s. 35(3).
93 Ibid., s. 47(1). Where a C.F.O. is guilty, the party, association, or candidate is also

guilty. A party may be fined $2,000, and in the case of an association or candidate, $1,000
(s. 47(2)).
94 Ibid., s. 49. If a corporation or trade union breaches any of the terms of the Act, the

maximum fine on conviction is $10,000 (s. 48).
95 Ibid.
96

kid., s. 54.

97 Under the Act, the only relevant duty of the Commission in this area is to "report
to the Attorney General any apparent contravention of this Act." Ibid., s. 4(1)(g).

98 See Manitoba, Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on Political
Financingand Election Expenses (Winnipeg: The Commission, 1977) at 76-77.
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of such abuse. To some extent this is perhaps surprising in view of
prior experience with legislation of this kind in both Canada and the
United States. 99 What that experience may suggest, however, is that
legislation of this kind can operated effectively only in a political
climate which is not hostile to the interests which are the targets of
the control. In Ontario, corporations enjoy a very sympathetic
political environment. The Progressive Conservative Party has been
very successful politically, with the result that there is no need to
step beyond the four corners of the legislation. In fact, any
disclosed irregularities would far outweigh any benefits that they
might bring with them. In that context, it is hardly surprising that
there has been only one prosecution under the Act. This involved
Mr. Vincent Corriero, a full-time student at York University, who
was charged with accepting contributions of five dollars, two dollars,
and one dollar while being an unregistered candidate for election to
the Provincial legislature in 1981,100 for which he was fined one
hundred and seventy-five dollars. 10' By all accounts Mr. Corriero
conducted a remarkable campaign. He had solicited contributions
by misrepresenting himself as being the Official Liberal candidate;
he opened a campaign office, the windows of which were covered
with pictures of Liberal politicians; he adopted the Liberal Party
logo; distributed party literature; and claimed he was the Liberal
candidate. 10 2 In addition, he failed to submit an audited statement
of his receipts and expenses to the Commission, and further to his
conviction under the 1975 Act in connection with the election, he
was arrested on seventeen charges of false pretences; eight charges

See supra, note 51.
100 Information supplied by the Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses.
See also Seventh Annual Report, supra, note 86 at 4-5.

101 "[I]n setting the amount of the [fine] the Judge first inquired into Mr. Corriero's
financial position and apparently, the amount of the fines took into consideration the fact that

Mr. Carriero is a full-time student at York University and his sole income is a student loan."
Memorandum to Commission Members from Mr. D.A. Joynt, Executive Director, 2 December
1981.
102 "He Faces 28 Raps Over Campaign" The [Toronto] Sun (11 September 1981) 55;
"'Liberal' Candidate Faces Fraud Charges" The [Toronto] Star (11 September 1981) A4; and
"Bogus Grit in Ontario Election Guilty' The [Toronto] Sun (13 November 1981) 89.
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of fraud,3 two charges of forgery, and one charge of spreading false
10
views.
III.

THE IMPACT OF THE LEGISLATION ON POLITICAL
FUND-RAISING

A. New Fund-Raising Techniques
The 1975 Act had a dramatic effect on the fund-raising
activities of the parties. Although no figures are available for the
period before 1975, it is acknowledged by officials of the Progressive
Conservative Party that about 90 percent of its income was raised
from big business.10 4 Obviously this could not continue after the
Act came into force, for the effect of the legislation was to seriously
constrain the spending power of each of the party's traditional
donors. The response of the Conservatives has been threefold.
First, it has broadened its corporate base in the sense that it now
solicits funding from a growing number of corporations. The
number of corporate donors to the Conservatives has risen from 761
in 1975105 to 1,316 in 1980106 to 2,210 in 1984,107 though
significantly the amount actually raised from these donors fell from
$1,097,637 in 1975'08 to $8,10,440 in 19801 9 and rose only to
$1,230,889 in 1984.110 Second, the party has cultivated a network
of individual donors and now raises about as much from individuals

103,"Boaus Grit in Ontario Election Guilty," ibid.
104 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 6.
105 Ontario, Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, Second Annual Report
of the Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses for the year 1976 (Toronto: The
Commission, 1977) at 35 [hereinafter Second Annual Report].
10 6

Seventh Annual Report, supra, note 86 at 37.

10 7

Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.

108 Second Annual Report, supra, note 105 at 35.
109 Seventh Annual Report, supra, note 86 at 37.
110 Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.
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as it does from corporations. 11 1 This is done mainly by using a
computerised Direct Mail programme whereby electors are
contacted by the party and invited to contribute to its funds. To
facilitate this process, lists of names are bought from "list brokers."
These brokers buy from magazine publishers the lists of subscribers
to the magazines, and the Conservative party buys the lists of those
magazines whose readers it anticipates might be sympathetic to the
party. The third response of the party has been to develop fundraising social events, the most notable of which are dinners, that
may be attended by the party leader and for which a high fee is
charged to attend. Although these events do not yield as much
money as either of the party's other two sources, it is seeking to
strengthen this aspect of fund-raising so that 1an
equal amount is
12
raised from each of the three different sources.
The Conservative party has perhaps been more responsive to
the new legal regime than any other party in Ontario. Indeed so
successful have its efforts been that it could afford to resist calls for
the size of the maximum permitted donations to rise from its
original two thousand dollars annually in order to keep pace with
inflation. 113 There can be little doubt, however, that had the need
arisen when it was in government, such a step would in fact have
been taken. The effect of the Act on the NDP has been much more
indirect. It is true that the legislation did interfere with the internal
affairs of the party. Before the passing of the Act the provincial
party's two main sources of income were individual members and
affiliated unions. 114 Because the party is a much more tightly
structured national organization, a portion of the money raised in
Ontario was passed to national party headquarters in Ottawa for use
for federal purposes. By section 30 of the 1975 Act this was no
longer possible, it being enacted that no registered party shall
directly or indirectly contribute or transfer funds to any political
In 1984 the Party raised $1,230,889 from corporations and $982,897 from individuals.
If the total of party and riding association income is considered, $2,024,076 was provided by

corporations in contrast to $2,107,754 provided by individuals. Ibid. at 19.
112 Information supplied to the author by the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario.
113 Ibid.
114 Information supplied to the author by the Ontario New Democratic Party.
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party not registered under that Act. If the provincial party was to
keep all the money which was available in Ontario, the federal party
would be starved of a substantial supply of income. What has
happened is that by agreement, the federal party collects the
donations from trade unions, while the provincial party retains all
the income which it raises in membership fees.115 As a result, only
a small amount comes to the provincial NDP from the local labour
movement.1 16 So insofar as the Act had an effect on the NDP, it
was indirect in the sense that the lack of any significant institutional
support meant that the party had to work hard for individual
donations. Another indirect effect of the Act on the NDP was that
the party felt the need to respond to the fund-raising activities of
the Conservatives. That party now raises more money than it did
before 1975 and its accounts are published. The NDP is under some
pressure to ensure that not too wide a gap exists between the
parties.
One effect of the Act for the NDP, therefore, may have been
to encourage the party to work harder for its money. However, it
is true to say that the gulf between the NDP and the Conservatives
remains wide despite these efforts and that the total income of the
11 7
NDP is only slightly less than 50 percent that of the Conservatives.
An interesting feature of NDP fund-raising from individuals is that
the techniques of fund-raising have not changed much, though the
party has certainly adopted a much more aggressive policy in pursuit
of the dollar. The party relies more on personal contacts than on
direct mail programmes./ 18 The party may organize blitzes of
certain areas during which members visit the homes of people who,
from canvassing returns, are thought to be sympathetic to the party.
These people will be encouraged to join the party or to contribute
to its funds. The party has spent some time training or advising
activists on how to handle these visits, and some party members and
115 Ibid.
116 In 1984, a total of only $33,850 was contributed by unions to the party and its riding
associations, compared to over $2 million contributed to the Progressive Conservative Party
and its riding associations. Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.
117 See infra, Table IV.
118 Information supplied to the author by the Ontario New Democratic Party.
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workers complain that too much time is now devoted to fund-raising
and too little to equally important matters such as formulation of
policy and ensuring the accountability of the party leadership.
Although the NDP does engage in a direct mail programme, this is
by no means as extensive as that of the Conservatives and it brings
in less than 10 percent of the party's income.1 19 In fact the NDP list
of names is less than ten thousand, compared with the thirty
thousand contributors who in 1982 appeared on the computer of the
Conservative party.120
The reason for the difference in the emphasis of direct
mailing in the two parties lies mainly in the different types of
people who typically support these parties. Direct mail depends for
its success on two ingredients: the target audience must be likely to
support the cause; and the targets must be people who are
accustomed to giving money through the mail. These requirements
present a difficulty for the NDP because it draws its support mainly
from organized labour and because middle class groups are more
likely to give money through the mail. Consequently there is a very
small market for NDP direct mail programmes, and it has been
difficult for the party to build up a mailing list. A very important
feature of the party's direct mailing programme is a follow-up
personal contact whereby the targets of the mailing will be
telephoned or perhaps even visited at home to encourage them to
support the party. Another fund-raising technique which the party
is trying to develop is the creation of a network of canvassers who
could exploit contacts with sympathetic middle class supporters and
encourage them to make substantial donations in addition to their
membership fee. The party will contact a member or supporter,
such as a university professor, a lawyer, or doctor, and ask them to
canvass financial support from colleagues at work.
This is
supplemented by the traditional events such as cocktail parties. But
while in 1982 a good event of this kind might attract twenty
thousand dollars for the NDP, the Conservatives were raising about
20 per cent of their considerable income from such sources.1 21 In
119 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Information supplied to the author by the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario.
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truth, direct mail, canvassing, and other fund-raising events raise
together only 10 per cent of the NDP'S income,1 22 no more than a
drop in the bucket by Conservative standards.
The 1975 Act also presented the Ontario Liberal Party with
a serious fund-raising problem. Before the enactment of the
legislation, the party looked to two hundred or so corporate donors
for its finance. 23 The Act has had the effect of reducing
significantly the income from this source, with the result that the
party has had to devise ways of raising money from individuals.
However, the party has been slow to develop organized techniques
of fund-raising and, as we will see, raises much less than either of
the other two main-line parties in the province. The party has only
recently started to think about direct mail, for the simple reason
that its former leader had no interest in it and perhaps also because
of the lack of encouragement from the federal party (which sat back
and watched the Conservatives build up a large list of names before
becoming interested).
Direct mail campaigns are conducted, but only on a small
scale because the party does not have a history or tradition of mass
membership to raise income. The party does "sell" memberships,
this tends to operate in a very disorganized and perfunctory manner.
Memberships are sold by riding associations, and the money
collected forms part of the income of the association. There is no
fixed membership fee, and it is only recently that the party has
sought to impose a uniform charge of ten dollars annually. In
addition to trying to introduce this uniform fee for membership, the
party introduced four field officers to help riding associations to
raise money. The riding associations in turn were expected to adopt
a much more aggressive approach to fund-raising, and those which
failed to come up to the mark were to be placed in trusteeship with
the provincial party. The central party would then appoint new
officials who it felt would do the job. The central party has a great
interest in the success of these endeavours, for it receives
25
124
percent of all fund-raising dollars paid to riding associations.
122 Information supplied to the author by Ontario New Democratic Party.
123 Information supplied to the author by the Ontario Liberal Party.
124 This information was supplied to the author by the Ontario Liberal Party.
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B. Changing Patterns of Coiporate Dependence
The published reports of the parties to the Commission show
that Ontario's contribution limits have had three consequences for
political fund-raising in the province. The first is the contribution
which the Act has made to the dependence of the parties on
institutional donors as a source of funding. The most profound
development has taken place in the Progressive Conservative Party
where in 1975 the provincial party and its riding associations
together received $2,799,801 by way of contributions, of which some
$2,135,468 was donated by corporations; in other words 76 percent
of the party's money came from corporations.1 25 For the provincial
headquarters, 91 percent was provided by corporations. 126 By 1983
and 1984 this situation had considerably changed. This is shown in
Table 1.127
Table I
Progressive Conservative Party Income Donated by Coiporations
(1)
Total
income

(2)
Total corporate
donations

(3)
(2) as %
of (1)

2,826,417
2,884,141

1,213,000
1,230,889

43%
43%

$

1983
1984

$

125 Second Annual Report, supra, note 105 at 35. These figures relate to total income
derived from donations in excess of one hundred dollars.
126 Ibid.
127 See Ontario, Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, Tenth Annual
Report of the Commission on Election Contributionsand Expenses for the year 1984 (Toronto:
The Commission, 1985) [hereinafter Tenth Annual Report]; and Eleventh Annual Report, supra,

note 36.
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The dependence of the party on corporations, therefore, though still
considerable at this level, has fallen. The nature of corporate
dependence is even less when the income of the party and the riding
associations combined are considered.
The fall in corporate
dependence (Table 11)128 in such a short period of time suggests that
in principle at least it should be possible for Ontario to move
towards the Quebec
system where donations are permitted only by
1 29
private individuals.
Table 1I
Income of Progressive Conservative Party and
RidingAssociations Donated By Corporations
(1)
Total
income

(2)
Total corporate
donations

(3)
(2) as 9
of (1)

5,181,445
6,101,390

1,817,592
2,024,076

35%
33%

$

1983
1984

$

This method had been rejected by the Camp Commission which
wrote in 1974:
... while constructing a model based upon disallowing corporate contributions, it
becomes obvious that the shortfall in available funds would be severe. It also seems
certain that the shortfall could not be made up by individual contributions unless

... corporate money is not simply to be re-routed. To do so would resolve nothing,
but merely encourage deception and
general cynicism, and make the political parties
3

either conspirators or bankrupts.

However, the experience of the Conservative party indicates that this
may have been too pessimistic a view. The fact remains that even
without corporate money the Progressive Conservatives would still
have more money to spend than either of their rivals.
12Ibid.
129 Election Act, S.Q. 1984, c. 51, s. 365.
130 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 8.
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Further evidence for the view that the parties could become
institutionally independent is provided by the information made
available by the NDP. Here the trend is not quite so dramatic
because the party has never been as dependent on institutional
finance as the Tories on corporate money. In addition, the Act
effectively prevents the party from receiving substantial union
donations, with the federal party having first call on these funds.
However, in 1975, the party headquarters and ridings received
$319,933 by way of donations, of which $36,786 was provided by the
unions.131 By 1984 the income of the provincial party had risen
considerably, yet union contributions had actually fallen.132 Thus, in
1984, the total income of the NDP (not including transfers from
constituency associations) was $1,832,312 of which $25,660 was
provided by trade unions. So while the total income of the party
had increased almost sixfold, the total contributions from unions had
fallen. In fact, only 1.4 percent of funds of the party are now
donated by unions, in contrast with 40 percent reported by the
Camp Commission in 1974.-33 Indeed, the dependence of the Party
is even less if the calculation is based on support for the party and
its riding associations. In 1984 the total income of both combined
was $3,247,912. The combined union and corporate donations meant
that in 1984 around 1.1 percent of party funds was provided by
institutional supporters.1 34 So successful has been the party in
developing individual contributions that it has been seriously able to
propose that Ontario adopt the Quebec system. In 1982 Mr. Jim
Renwick, a senior provincial NDP politician, stated that this is a
matter which his party would be discussing at length and claimed
that there was "a lot to be said in the theory of democratic
parliamentary government about ...
eliminating contributions ...
from

corporations and trade unions."135 Renwick responded to a question

131 Second Annual Report, supra, note 105 at 35.
132 Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.

133 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 6.
13 4

Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.

135 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Standing Committee on Procedural Affairs, supra, note

75 at 6.
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which suggested that such a proposal would have a substantial effect
on the contributions of his party by saying that "the contributions to
other parties, perhaps from the corporate world,
would offset any
13 6
NDP.'
the
on
have
would
that
effect
negative
The evidence from party reports to the Commission indicates
that in principle it would be possible to prohibit corporate donations.
But there are two problems which might make it difficult to
introduce such a change to the law of Ontario. The first problem
relates to the structure of government within the political parties,
and particularly within the Conservative and Liberal parties. In both
parties, riding associations enjoy considerable autonomy from the
central party organization. 137 In both parties the riding associations
now raise large sums of money. In fact, the combined income of the
riding associations is greater than that of the central party. Yet
party officials claim to see very little of the money raised locally, this
being jealously protected by the local associations. It has to be said,
however, that this claim is simply not supported by the evidence.
The Liberals in particular have received regular annual subventions
from local associations, this accounting for between 25 to 33 percent
of total income
nationally and about 35 percent of combined local
1 38
expenditure.
A more serious obstacle to a movement in the Quebec
direction is that the Ontario Liberal Party appears to be unable to
shake its dependence on corporate money. In 1980 the Liberals at
headquarters relied on corporations for 77 percent of their income
while the provincial party together with the riding associations relied
139
on corporations for 69 percent of the total income of the party.
And indeed, it may be significant that at a time when the NDP was
beginning to question the role of corporate money,1 40 the Liberals
in contrast were looking at devices for shaking the corporate "money

136 Ibid.
137 Information supplied to the author by officials of the Progressive Conservative Party

of Ontario and the Ontario Liberal Party.
13 8

Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 17-20.

139 Seventh Annual Report, supra, note 86 at 29.
140 Supra, note 135.
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tree." In 1982, in a submission to the Legislature's Standing
Committee on Procedural Affairs, the following point was made by
the party's President:
...
we are concerned about the ability of certain corporations doing business in
Ontario to make contributions to parties which they support.
As you know, certain United States legislation has been used as an excuse by many
companies not to participate in the political processes provided for under the
Election Finances Reform Act. This, we believe, is an illegitimate application of
the United States extraterritorial jurisdiction. As such, we believe it is unacceptable.
The Ontario Liberal Party urges members of the committee to search the ways to
encourage Canadian subsidiaries of foreign companies to participate in appropria
te ways provided for under the acts. Furthermore, we suggest that the governme
nt of Ontario seek discussions with the Department of External
Affairs and other
141
relevant federal agencies to seek ways to rectify this situation.

Since then the level of corporate dependence has fallen, but it
remains true that in both 1983 and 1984 at least 48 percent of the
142
party's income was donated by corporations.
C. FinancialInequality

A third feature of party financing since 1975 is the
considerable financial inequality which exists between the parties.
This is reflected by both campaign income and expenditure, and by
annual income and expenditure. At the Provincial election in 1981

the Conservatives collected receipts of 2.4 million dollars, compared
with $909,396 raised by the O.L.P. and $224,271 raised by the NDP.
Expenditure in turn amounted to 3.3 million dollars, 1.1 million
dollars, and $624,599 respectively. 143
In other words, the
Conservatives spent almost double that spent by the other two

parties combined.

In 1985 the gap in spending levels narrowed,

though it was still rather wide.

Conservative campaign receipts in

that year amounted to 2.6 million dollars, while those of the Liberals
and the NDP amounted to 1.7 million dollars and $437,321
141 Supra, note 84 at 7.
142 Based on figures made available in Tenth Annual Report, supra, note 127, and
Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.
143 Seventh Annual Report, supra, note 86 at 41.
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respectively. Conservative spending, however, was an astonishing
4.2 million dollars, compared with only 1.6 million dollars by the
Liberals and 1.3 million dollars by the NDP.14 4 In 1985, therefore,
the Liberals and the NDP combined had risen to about 66 percent of
the level of expenditure of the Conservatives. And it is to be noted
that it is not only in the case of central party expenditure that this
benefit is enjoyed.
At the 1981 election, for example, the
Conservative candidate was the highest spender in 103 of the 126
constituencies.1 45
In fact, in seventy-one of the seats, the
Progressive Conservative candidate spend 50 percent or more of the
total election expenditure in the riding. Indeed, in seventeen seats
the Conservative candidate spent 66 percent or more of the total
1 46
election expenditures incurred in the riding.
If we move from campaign activity to examine the annual
income and expenditure of the three main parties, we also find a
marked inequality of fortunes. The annual income of the parties is
shown in Table 111.147

Table III
Income of the PoliticalParties
1983

1984

Progressive
Conservative Party

3,005,417

3,118,296

Liberal Party

972,623

918,835

New Democratic
Party

2,226,531

3,010,710

144 Information supplied to the author by the Commission on Election Finances.
145 Information extracted from figures published in Seventh Annual Report, supra, note
86 at 56-69.
14

6

nbid.
147 Supra, note 127.
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The figures in Table III suggest that although the Liberals are a
long way behind, there is nevertheless not a lot between the other
two parties. This, however, is misleading. The reason why the NDP
appears to do so well is because the party headquarters draws
heavily on the revenue of local associations. In 1984 over one-third
of the party's income ($1,178,398) was provided by transfers from
by the
the local associations, compared with $234,155 received
148
Progressive Conservatives from its riding associations.
If the income of the riding associations is added to that of
the central party organization, a rather different picture emerges.
This is shown in Table IV.149
Table IV
Income of Central Party and Riding Associations Combined
1983

1984

5,181,445

6,101,390

Liberal Party

1,529,249

1,445,847

New Democratic
Party

2,762,379

3,247,912

$

Progressive

$

Conservative Party

It is clear then that there is a wide gulf in the income of the parties.
Inevitably this is reflected in the spending levels each year. In 1984,
for example, Progressive Conservative headquarters spent $3,225,312,
while the NDP spent less than half, $1,509,306, and the Liberals even
less still, $775,854.150 A full measure of the different spending levels

148 Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 19.
149 Supra, note 127.

150 Ibid.
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can be obtained by adding the expenses of the headquarters with
1 51
that of each of the riding associations.
Table V
Expenditure of Central Party and Riding Associations
1983

$

1984

Progressive
Conservative Party

4,332,358

5,758,283

Liberal Party

1,196,066

1,139,750

New Democratic
Party

2,511,653

1,820,044

$

An important question which arises is why there should be
this wide gulf between the parties. An obvious possible reason is
that the Conservatives raise and spend more money because a larger
number of people contribute. This cannot be tested, however, from
the published information. Details are given only about donations
in excess of $100, so that the total number of donors is simply not
known.
What is known, however, is that the Progressive
Conservatives appear to receive more large donations, that is to say,
they receive considerably more donations of over $100 from persons
than do the other parties. Thus, in 1984, the Conservatives received
8,248 such donations in contrast with 1,440 received by the Liberals
and 4,679 by the NDP. 1 5 2 It is also known that the Conservatives
obtain a greater portion of their income than the other parties from
donations in excess of $100. In 1984 donations to the Tories from
all sources in excess of $100 amounted to 4.1 million dollars, some
68 percent of their income. This contrasted with $850,638 to the
Liberals and $852,068 to the NDP, accounting for under 59 percent
151 Supra, note 127.
152

Ibid.
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and 26 percent then of their total income respectively.15 3 The size
of the average donation is impossible to determine because only
donations of more than $100 are reported. It is likely, however, that
the size of the average Conservative donation will be larger than
that of the other parties, in view of the fact that so much more of
its income is provided by donations in excess of $100. It is to be
noted that in 1984 the size of the average donation in excess of
$100 was $315 in the case of the Conservatives, but only $178 in the
case of the NDP. 154 Again the reasons for this difference are
unknown, though it may not be unrelated to the tax rules relating
to tax credits. But it does appear that one reason for the large gulf
between the parties is that the Tories receive larger donations than
their rivals.
A second possible reason for the large gulf between the
parties is the number and size of contributions from corporate
sources. It is here that the Conservatives and the Liberals
potentially have a great advantage over the NDP in view of the
effective restriction on any significant union donations. The
importance of institutional donations to each of the three parties is
shown in Tables VI, VII, and VIII.'55
Table VI
Coporate Support of the Progressive Conservatives
(1)
Total
income

(2)
No. of
Contributions

(3)
Value of
Contributions

5,181,445
6,101,390

4,048
4,863

1,817,592
2,024,076

$

1983
1984

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.

$
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Table VII
CorporateSupport of the Liberal Party

(1)

Total
Income

No. of
Contributions

(3)
Value of
Contributions

1,529,249
1,445,847

915
868

481,704
471,243

(2)

$

1983
1984

$

There is clearly a significant difference between the Conservatives
and the Liberals in terms of both the number of donations and the
value of corporate donations. The difference is even more marked
when comparisons are made with the NDP, though here corporate
support of the party is so minimal that it is combined, for the
purposes of presentation, with support from the trade unions to
demonstrate institutional support.
Table VIII
Institutional Support of the

(1)

Total
income
1983
1984

(2)
No. of
Contributions

2,762,379
3,247,917

NDP

(3)
Value of
Contributions
18,705
35,700

IV. FURTHER REFORM OF THE LEGISLATION - BILL 103
A. PoliticalPressure in Ontario
The analysis in Part III of this article reveals an unacceptable
state of affairs. Although the difference in the income of the parties
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may well be less than it was before 1975, it is still too high, and it
is hardly an overstatement to claim that the wide gulf in the income
and expenditure of the parties is an affront to the democratic
process. In the parliamentary system, it is crucial to the effective
operation of party government that the electors should have a choice
in a competition between parties that articulate different policies and
reflect different values and commitments. Clearly, in modern liberal
democracies, the individual elector may not always have the option
of voting for the party of his or her choice. Nevertheless, it is
crucial to the operation of party government that the electorate
should have some choice, even though it may not suit or satisfy
everyone. The legitimacy of party government is based partly on the
assumption that there will be more than one player in the game.
One party states are the very antithesis of democracy. Methods
which effectively produce one party rule in liberal democratic
regimes are also undemocratic. No one would deny that party
government would be meaningless if only one party was able to raise
money and mount an effective campaign. By the same token, the
values of party government are seriously threatened if no party is
able to compete financially with the front runner. In other words,
the values of parliamentary democracy are seriously threatened when
one party is able to exploit financial resources as an electoral
advantage by campaigning in a manner which is far beyond the
means of any other party. Its message can be projected much more
loudly, widely, and effectively.
It is clear that the 1975 Act was in need of reform to
eliminate the impact of the wide differences in the income and
expenditure of the parties. It is thus not surprising that these
weaknesses in the law led to calls for change from the opposition
parties in the Province. The first major development was the
introduction of Bill 206 in 1981, a measure sponsored by Mr.
Mancini, a Liberal member.1 5 6 The Bill contained a number of
important proposals. First, and surprisingly in view of the problems
of Liberal fund-raising, he proposed that political contributions were
to be made only by individuals and not by corporations or trade

156 Bill 206, An Act to Amend the Election Finances Reform Act, 1st Sess., 32nd Leg.,

Ont., 1981.
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unions1 57 Second, an attempt was made to encourage contributions
by the use of the tax system. Thus, it was provided in the Bill that
"an individual who is liable to pay tax may add an additional amount
not exceeding five dollars to such tax and designate the additional
amount as a contribution to a registered party."158 The provincial
Treasurer would then be under a duty to transfer the funds so
collected to the political parties in question.' 5 9 Third, the Bill
proposed the introduction of spending limits on both candidates and
parties. Candidate limits would be based on a figure calculated by
multiplying the number of votes by ninety cents, and the party limit
would be based on a formula of the number of voters multiplied by
thirty-five cents 60 The last major proposal in the Bill related to
government advertising, with clause 14 seeking to prohibit the
government "during the period commencing with the issue of a writ
for an election and terminating on polling day" from publishing "any
information or particulars of the activities of the government body,
except in the case of an emergency where the public interest
requires such publication."1 61 It is to be noted, however, that the
Bill was the final one of the session and received little discussion in
the legislature. Although given a first reading on 17 December
162
1981, it made no further progress.
The political pressure was maintained, however, when in the
following year the subject was considered by the Standing Committee
on Procedural Affairs in September 1982. The NDP claimed that

157 Ibid., cl. 1, 2, 3, 7 and 8.
158 Ibid., cl. 9.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid., cl. 10. The limits would be adjusted to take account of inflation.
161 Ibid., cl. 14. A number of other Bills have been introduced addressing this particular
issue. See Bill 80, An Act to Amend the Election FinancesRefonn Act, 3rd Sess., 32nd Leg.,
Ont., 1983; and Bill 5, An Act to Amend the Election FinancesReform Act, 3rd Sess., 33rd
Leg., Ont., 1986.
162 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates: Official Report, 1st Sess., 32nd Parl. (17
December 1981) cols. 4819-20.

The Funding of PoliticalParties

1989]

spending limits were a "major concern" of the party' 63 and submitted
that:
When we are trying to equalize the opportunities for the various parties to put their
message before the public, and when the media have such an overwhelming effect
on the way in which that message can be delivered ...
it is most appropriate that
consideration should be given to limiting total expenditures, limiting expenditures
on the media, and apportioning 16
4 access to the media among the active
the
process.
participants in the election

The Liberals made a similar case. The party noted that some
candidates for political office abused the fact that there were no
spending limits. These abuses, contended the party, were "alarming
in the extreme. 1 65 The party also claimed that "if the views of many
citizens today are negative about the political process and the
participants in it at least one cause seems to be the excesses in
spending of some candidates."1 6 6 Mr. Jim Evans, the party president,
claimed that at each election the liberals received "literally hundreds
of phone calls from people who are offended by the overkill of
excessive campaigning by all parties."1 67 One of the dangers of the
present system of almost unregulated expenditures was the
development in Canada of the less acceptable features of American
style campaigning. Mr. Evans could "foresee ten-million-dollar
campaigns in this decade and that is outrageous."168 Of particular
concern to the Liberals was the expenditure incurred by Mr. Larry
Grossman in the riding of St. Andrew-St. Patrick at the 1981
election. The sum of $90,552 spent represented, in the view of the
Liberals, "irresponsible opportunism."1 69 Mr. Evans continued:
[I]t is with these excesses in mind that we make the following recommendation: that
the act be amended to include limits on campaign spending by each candidate of
every registered party during the period of the campaign. This period would take

163 Supra, note 135 at 6.
164 Ibid. at 7.
165 Supra, note 84 at 3.

166 Ibid.
167 Ibid. at 11.

168 Ibid. at 22.
169 Ibid. at 4.
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effect at the moment of the declaration of the writ of election and terminate with
the closing of the polls.
During that time, we believe each candidate should be limited along the lines of
approximately the following formula: 90 cents per elector for the first 25,000
electors and for each additional elector in a constituency, 50 cents per elector. We
would recommend excepting intraparty transfers from these limits.
Using this formula, it is easy to see what the effect would be. In a small riding
having only 30,000 electors, let us say, the campaign period limit would amount to
$25,000. In a large riding such as the one I live in, which is Scarborough North,
having approximately 90,000 electors, the campaign limit would be approximately
$55,000.
These, we believe, are realistic limits that should be adjusted from time to time to
account for inflation. To allow for that adjustment, the commission should be
allowed some discretionary authority for periodic increases of the allowance.
One further point needs to be made about spending limits in campaign periods.
It must be pointed out that candidates spending excessively are also being subsidized
by the taxpayers of Ontario through the rebate scheme provided for in the act. We
believe that if this is permitted to continue, only more and more cynicism
about the
170
political process will develop. We believe prompt action is necessary.

These recommendations were reinforced by claims that current
spending levels were offensive to many non-partisan voters and were

necessary to stem the
rising tide of public disgust at what went on
171
campaigns.
some
in
Unsurprisingly, the adoption of spending controls was not
supported by the Ontario Conservatives. Three arguments in
particular were raised by Tory members during the proceedings of
the Standing Committee in 1982. First, it was argued that spending
limits penalize success in the sense that a popular and well-organized
party is disabled from spending what it can raise. Such parties are
thereby constrained by the inefficiency and lack of support for their
opponents. 172 Thus, NDP witnesses were accused of "saying, in
effect," that
for whatever reason, different people support your party than do my party or the
Liberal Party, which is quite fair, but if you have a set of rules, then under those
rules you say party A has more difficulty in raising money that party B, then you
ought to change the rules. But in a free and democratic society each party, and

170 Ibid.
171 Ibid. at 16.
172 Ibid. at 17.
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67

each candidate from each riding in each party, has exactly the same right3 to go to
exactly the same people to ask for exactly the same amount of money.

Second, it was claimed that spending limits would violate not only
the rights of the party, but also those of individual citizens, Thus,

it was argued ingeniously:
If by an accident of political philosophy or whatever, some of the people who
support you for whatever reason do not want to give as much money, or not as
much as the people who support me, why should I or my contributors have to suffer
when you are in effect saying to the people who want to contribute to my campaign,
"Your money can't be spent; but the money of the people who contributed to some
other campaign, can be 0spent," because more people want to contribute to, say,
. 174
someone else's campaign than to one of your campaigns.

And finally, it was contended that spending controls are unfair

because they take no account of non-financial contributions which
may be made to the parties. 1 75 These contributions include labour

time which may be of great value, yet which may not be as available
to some parties as dollars. The point was also pursued by Mr.
Rotenberg:
If I have a subdivision in my riding and I want to drop 200 pieces of literature, if
it takes a campaign worker six hours to do it, in rough figures, some of his time will
be worth $10 an hour but nobody is paying for it, he is donating to me what could
be $60 worth of time if I had to pay a delivery service for someone to go and drop
that literature to every house in the subdivision. Yet he voluntarily donates his
time. It is not a contribution and not an expense. But if the same supporter of
mine, or Jim's or any party, instead of donating that 10 hours of time which is not
a donation for election expense purposes, gives me a cheque for $60 and I go and
pay the postman $60 for 200 pieces of mail at 30 cents a stamp, that is a donation
and that is an expense. The point I am trying to make is, in this whole problem
of limiting campaign expenditures, which is really the fairness, as you say, of the
campaign, the result to me as a candidate is better if my worker goes out and
spends the time personally delivering that literature than his donating the cash and
my paying the postman for doing exactly the same job.
Yet in your whole scenario, the money for stamps is part of the expenditure which
should be limited, but the volunteer time of the worker who is, in effect, doing 1the
76
same job in this analogy should not be limited. I see some unfairness in that.

173 Supra, note 135 at 19 (Mr. D. Rotenberg).
174 Ibid.
175 Supra, note 84 at 35 (Morning Sitting).
176 Supra, note 135 at 16.
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He continued by elaborating his point in the following terms:
The point I am trying to make is that if you are having unlimited donations of time,
which I agree with, and you are having limited donations of money, which I also
agree with - maybe $500 is too much in your scenario - once you allow the person
to collect all the workers he wants and all the $500 bills he wants, on which you
seem to agree with me, it seems to me a little unfair to say, "I can spend all the
1 77
donation time I've got, but I can't spend all the donated money I've got.'

B. Developments Elsewhere in Canada
The proposals for reform which were being made by the then
opposition parties in Ontario were already operating in several
Canadian jurisdictions. In 1974 the Canada Elections Act, the
federal law on election financing, was radically amended by the
Election Expenses Act.178 In contrast to the Ontario statute of 1975,
this Act did not restrict the size of contributions to political
parties179 though it did require disclosure.180 It also introduced
limited public funding for candidates. More significantly, it imposed
limits on campaign expenditures by both candidates and political
parties. 181 The spending limits in the federal statute have given rise
to considerable difficulty. A major problem has been how to protect
the spending limits from being out flanked through campaigning by
groups other than the political parties - the problem of so-called
"third party expenditures." The legislature dealt with this by making
it an offence for anyone other than a candidate or a party to incur
election expenses in the campaign period.18 2 This offence was
177 Ibid. at 18.
178 Election Expenses Act 1973-74, supra, note 16.
179 It has been pointed out, however, that the parties imposed a voluntary ceiling on
how much they would receive by way of donations from a single company. Initially, this was
$50,000 for elections and $25,000 between elections. See J. Wearing, The L-Shaped Party:
The Liberal Pany of Canada 1958-1980 (Scarborough: McGraw Hill Ryerson, 1981) at 232.
180 Election Expenses Act, supra, note 16, s. 4, amending Canada Elections Act, R.S.C.
1970 (1st Supp.), c.14.
181 Ibid., ss 4, 7, amending Canada Elections Act, ibid.
182 Election Expenses Act 1973-74, ibid., s. 12, inserting a new s. 70.1 to the Canada
Elections Act, ibid.
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qualified by an important exception; the Act would not apply if the
accused established that he incurred election expenses
(a) for the purpose of gaining support for views held by him on an issue of public
policy, or for the purpose of advancing the aims of any organization or association,
other than a political party or an organization or association of a partisan political
character, of which he was a member and on whose behalf the expenses were
incurred; and
(b) in good faith and not for any purpose related to the provisions of this Act
limiting the amount of election expenses that may be incurred by any other person
18 3
on account of or in respect of the conduct or management of an election.

This qualification proved to be inadequate because the defence was
too widely drawn,1 8 4 permitting groups other than political parties
to spend during election campaigns without restriction. Indeed, the
Chief Electoral Officer was moved to comment
Election Expenses Incurred by Persons Other Than Candidates and Agents of
Registered Parties - 70.1. As it now stands, the wording of this section permits any
person or non-political organization or association to incur election expenses,
between the date of the issue of the writ for an election and the day immediately
following polling day, to directly promote or oppose a particular registered party or
the election of a particular candidate. In defending any prosecution initiated under
this section, these individuals or organizations may claim that they were "promoting
an issue of public policy" or that they were "advancing the aims of their
organization" even though they did not identify those issues and/or aims in their
advertisement, provided they were able to show they were acting in good faith. It
is a matter of record that a number of persons who were not acting on behalf of
or with the knowledge and consent of candidates or registered agents of political
parties have availed themselves of this provision of the Act during past elections.
These people have spent unlimited sums of money to promote or oppose a
particular candidate or registered party, sums which they do not have to account
18 5
for in terms of sources or amount.

The legislation was eventually amended by Bill C-169 on 25
October 1983 (by repealing the defence originally contained in
section 70.1(4)).186 This provided that only candidates and registered

political parties could incur election expenditures during a campaign
183 Canada ElectionsAct, ibid., s. 70.1(4), as inserted by the Election Expenses Act 197374, ibid., s. 12.
184 See R. v. Roach (1978), 101 D.L.R. (3d) 736.
185 Canada, Office of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, Statutory Report 1983
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1983) 74.
186 An Act to Amend the Canada Election Act (No. 3), S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 164, s. 14.
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period. In other words, the legislature responded to the problem of
third party expenditures by prohibiting them altogether. The
difficulty with this, however, was the Charter which purports to
protect freedom of expression. The effect of Bill C-169 was to deny
expression altogether during the campaign period. It took, in fact,
less than a year for the Bill to be successfully challenged in the
Alberta Court of Queens Bench. In National Citizens' CoalitionInc.
v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada,187 the Court accepted without much
analysis that the disputed sections of Bill C-169 "on their face do
limit the actions of anyone other than registered parties or
candidates from incurring election expenses during the prescribed
time and in this sense there is a restriction on freedom of
expression. 188 The argument consequently centered mainly on
section 1, with the defence arguing that the limits imposed on the
freedom of expression were "reasonable" and "demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society."189 The case for the defence was
that the "change in the law made in 1983 was ... necessary to protect

the interest of the legislation which had imposed spending
restrictions on candidates and parties for the purpose of providing
a system of fairness and equality of opportunity in the election of
Members of Parliament."190
The main argument was that the legislation was necessary to
protect equality of opportunity in federal elections.
In this
connection reference was made to developments in the United
States, and in particular the mischief caused by political action
committees. 191 Thus these organizations "have expended large sums
of money in opposing the election of certain candidates to the U.S.
Congress. This could happen in Canada, it was contended, if [Bill
C-169] were not in effect and have a harmful effect on the system

187 (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 481.
188 Ibid. at 487 (Medhurst J.).
189 Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, s. 1, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982,
being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11.
190 Supra, note 187 at 491 (Medhurst J.).

191 For an account of the activities of PACs, see LJ. Sabato, PAC: Inside the World of
PoliticalAction Committees (New York: Norton, 1984).
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which is now in place for conducting federal elections. 192 The court
was, however, strongly impressed by freedom of expression
considerations "said by many to be one of the most significant of
freedoms in a democratic society since the political structure depends
on free debate of ideas and opinions."'193 Medhurst J. relied heavily

on Reference Re Alberta Legislation 94 in the course of which Cannon
J. stated:
Under the British system, which is ours, no political party can erect a prohibitory
barrier to prevent the electors from getting information concerning the policy of the
Government. Freedom of discussion is essential to enlighten public opinion in a
democratic State; it cannot be curtailed without affecting the right of the people to
be informed through sources independent of the Government concerning matters
of public interest. There must be an untrammelled publication of the
news and
95
political opinions of the political parties contending for ascendancy.

192 Supra, note 187 at 495 (Medhurst J.).
193 Ibid. at 492 (Medhurst J.).
194 [1938] 2 D.L.R. 81.
195 Ibid. at 119. See also Chief Justice Duff who in the same case said:
There can be no controversy that such institutions derive their efficacy from the free
public discussion of affairs, from criticism and answer and counter-criticism, from
attack upon policy and administration and defence and counter-attack; from the
freest and fullest analysis and examination from every point of view of political
proposals. This is signally true in respect of the discharge by Ministers of the
Crown of their responsibility to Parliament, by members of Parliament of their duty
to the electors, and by the electors themselves of their responsibilities in the election
of their representatives.
The right of public discussion is, of course, subject to legal restrictions; those based
upon considerations of decency and public order, and others conceived for the
protection of various private and public interests with which, for example, the laws
of defamation and sedition are concerned. In a word, freedom of discussion means,
to quote the words of Lord Wright in James v. Commonwealth of Australia, [1986]
AC. 578 at p. 627, "freedom governed by law."
Even with its legal limits, it is liable to abuse and grave abuse, and such abuse is
constantly exemplified before our eyes; but it is axiomatic that the practice of this
right of free public discussion of public affairs, notwithstanding its incidental
mischiefs, is the breath of life for parliamentary institutions.
Ibid. at 107. Also interesting in this context is Switzmnan v. Elbling and A.-G. of Quebec,
[1957] S.C.R. 285.
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The Court concluded that a limit on freedom of expression "should
be assessed on the basis that if it is not permitted then harm will be
caused to other values in society. '19 6 In this case it was pointed
out, rightly it is submitted, that "there was very little actual evidence
of the abuses of section 70(1) to support the recommendation that
had been made by the Chief Electoral Officer."1 9 7

So section 1

failed the defence for want of evidence, with the result that the
legislative measures under review violated the Charter and were
consequently "of no force or effect."198
Despite problems raised by the Charter, the federal
jurisdiction is not the only one with spending limits. Similar
provisions operate in Saskatchewan 19 9 and New Brunswick,2 °° the
196 Supra, note 187 at 496 (Medhurst 3.).
197 Ibid. The evidence is not very fully considered in the judgment of the court. The
attention of the court was drawn to the event leading to the decision in R. v. Roach, supra,
note 184 as an example of the mischief tackled by the Act. The court continued:
It is argued that this change was necessary and justifiable. It is said that candidates
and parties have spending limitations, are subject to regulations of reporting and
advertising constraints and are therefore vulnerable to third parties who are outside
of these controls.
Another example provided of the possible mischief of uncontrolled third party
activities is the advertisement published by the Jewish Joint Public Relations
Committee just before the 1980 election in opposition to the candidate Frank Epp
in Kitchener-Waterloo at a time when no response was permitted. Counsel for the
plaintiff notes that this advertisement was placed on the final day permitted for
candidates and parties and this alleged flaw in the law could have been dealt with
by extending this restriction to third parties.
Evidence was also given by Douglas Fisher, a present Member of Parliament and
head of the Liberal caucus from Toronto. He stated that threats had been made
by the anti-seat hunting organization to the effect that large sums of money would
be spent in opposition to Liberal candidates in Toronto unless their policy
respecting seal hunting activities on the east coast was changed. This is said to be
unfair to such candidates who are subject to spending restrictions.
Further submission was made by the defendant concerning expenditures of large
sums of money by organizations such as the plaintiff in this action during the 1979
and 1980 general elections in opposition to certain candidates.
Ibid. at 491.
198 Ibid. at 496.
199 7he Election Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. E-6, s. 208.
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measures in each case pre-dating the Charter In Manitoba 20 1 and

Quebec, 20 2 however, legislation has been introduced since the
Charter,although in the latter case the measure in question merely

continues measures introduced in 1978.203

The legislation in

Manitoba was assented to on 18 August 1983, and this repealed the
Elections FinancesAct 1980204 which was similar in many respects

to the Ontario Act of 1975. In its place was enacted a new and
comprehensive measure which included campaign spending limits.
So far as the political parties are concerned, the Act provides by
section 50(1) that
Subject to section 52, the total election expenses incurred by or on behalf of a
registered political party, including election expenses incurred by any person or
organization acting on behalf of the registered political party with the knowledge
and consent of the registered political party, shall not exceed
(a) in the case of a registered political party in relation to a general election, the
amount determined by multiplying $80 by the number of names on the revised
voters' lists for all the electoral divisions in which the registered political party
endorses candidates.

Similar constraints are imposed on candidates. 20 5

imposes a limit on

advertising expenses

The Act also

of parties 20 6 and

candidates, 20 7 although these are included in, and are not in addition

to, the total election expenses permitted under section 50. Apart
from this important contrast with the federal legislation, there is

another difference; there is no restriction whatsoever placed upon
independent third party expenditures. The legislation, therefore, is
not threatened by a Charter challenge of the type mounted in the

National Citizen's Coalition case.

This is not to say that the

200 PoliticalProcess FinancingAct, S.N.B. 1978, c. P-9.3, s. 77(1).
201 Elections FinancesAct, S.M. 1982-84, c. 45.
202 Election Act, supra, note 129.
203 An Act to Govern the Financingof PoliticalParties, R.S.Q. 1977, c. F-2.
204 Elections FinancesAct, S.M. 1980, c. 68.
205 Election FinancesAct, supra, note 201, s. 50(2).
206 Ibid., s. 51(1).
207 Ibid., s. 51(2).
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spending controls will be immune from Charter challenge on other
grounds. But this is a point to which we shall return.
C. The Liberal-NDP Coalition Government
The election of 2 May 1985 presented the opportunity for
further reforms to be introduced in Ontario. The electors of the
Province produced an outcome in which none of the parties had an
overall majority. The Progressive Conservative Party has the largest
party in the legislature with fifty-two seats, but the Liberals had
forty-eight and the New Democrats twenty-five. The LieutenantGovernor then called upon the leader of the Conservative party,
Frank Miller, to form a government. On May 28, however, the
leader of the Liberal Party, David Peterson, and the leader of the
NDP, Bob Rae, signed an accord in which the NDP agreed to support
the Liberals and to defeat the government in the Legislative
Assembly. This was done on May 31, with a vote of non-confidence
being passed in the House, following which Peterson was sworn in
as Premier of Ontario. For the first time in forty-two years, Ontario
had a government other than Progressive Conservative. 20 Given
the pressure for reform of the campaign finance legislation which
both of the previous opposition parties had generated, there was
thus now an opportunity to give some substance to their demands.
The opportunity was quickly seized, and indeed the promise of
legislation was one of the conditions of the May accord between the
two parties. This provided for the introduction of "election financing
reform to cover spending
limits and rebates, at both the central and
20 9
local campaign level.

A Bill to implement this commitment was introduced in the
House on 7 July 1986210 and received Royal assent only three days

2 08

Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 1-2.

209 D. Peterson and B. Rae, An Agenda for Reform. Proposals for minority parliament.
28 May 1985 [mimeo] (Toronto 1985).
210 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates: Official Report, 2nd Sess., 33rd Par], (7 July
1986) cols. 2190-93.
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later, on 10 July 1986.211 A remarkable feature of the legislative
process was the lack of any detailed consideration given to the
measure by the legislature. Indeed the debates occupy only about
twenty-one columns of Hansard, despite the apparently controversial
nature of the Bill. 212 The reason for this lack of detailed analysis by
legislators is that the terms of the Bill had been exhaustively
considered by an ad hoc committee of party leaders, in the
proceedings of which the Commission was invited to attend. But
how could agreement on these principles be secured given earlier
Progressive Conservative resistance to the type of reform which has
now been initiated? The answer may be found in the new political
circumstances. Two factors in particular troubled the Conservatives.
In the first place, "The General Election of 1985 had the highest
cost in history,"213 and the Conservatives came out of the election
with a deficit of five million dollars.2 1 4 Secondly, it has been
speculated that the Conservatives were much more willing to
accommodate reform now that they were in opposition. It is a well
established maxim that political money tends to follow political
success. Since the election Liberal Party officials find, for example,
that corporations are more ready to support their cause. So the
Conservatives were now more willing to accept reforms proposed by
the other parties as part of a package which contained a number of
other measures to help alleviate their financial difficulties.
1. By any standards Bill 103 is a radical and comprehensive
measure. It repeals the 1975 Act and re-enacts many of its
provisions to produce a clear and comprehensive code.21 5 Thus it
retains, with modifications, the reporting requirement of the 1975

211 Ibid., (10 July 1986) col. 2373.
212 See Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates: Official Report 2nd Sess., 33rd Parl. (7
July 1986) cols. 2190-93; (8 July 1986) cols. 2232, 2237-40 (Second Reading), 2240-44; (9 July
1986) cols. 2270-71 (Committee).
213 Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note 36 at 4.
214 At the end of 1984 the party had a deficit of 2.8 million dollars. Ibid. at 17. In
the course of the 1985 campaign, the party's campaign receipts amounted to 2.6 million dollars
while its campaign expenses amounted to 4.3 million dollars. Information supplied to the

author by the Commission on Election Finances.
215 Election FinancesAct, S.O. 1986, c. 33.
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217
Act,216 contribution limits by individuals, corporations and unions,
and the public subsidy for candidate's election expenses. 218 In
addition the Act introduced four major reforms. First, the various
limits which had been operating since 1975 were raised. So far as
contributions are concerned, individual contributors may now give
four thousand dollars annually to each registered party, 219 and seven
220
hundred and fifty dollars to a registered constituency association,
with the permitted aggregate contributions to constituency
associations being raised to three thousand dollars.221 In addition,
similar amounts may be contributed during a campaign period, 222
with the result that an individual corporation or a union may donate
a maximum of twenty thousand dollars to a single party in each
legislative cycle. Apart from thus raising the levels of permitted
contributions
donations, theAct also raised the tax credit for political
223
to encourage electors to give more generously.
2. Apart from raising the tax credit allowed in the original
Act, Bill 103 extends the public funding facility, 224 which as
introduced in 1975 was made available only to candidates to help
meet campaign costs. 225 In this respect Ontario contrasted rather
unfavourably with other jurisdictions. The federal statute made
to
provision for the public funding of political parties, though only 226
the extent of providing reimbursement of broadcasting expenses.

216 Ibid., ss 42-43.
217 Ibid., s. 19.
218 Ibid., s. 46.
219 Ibid., s. 19(1)(a)(i).
220 Ibid., s. 19(l)(a)(ii).
221 ibid.
222 Ibid., s. 19(2).

223 Ibid., s. 58, substituting a new s. 7(6) of the Income Tax Act, supra, note 74.
224 Ibid., s. 46(6).
225 Election Finances Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 134, s. 45(1).
226 Election Expenses Act 1973-74, supra, note 16, inserting a new s. 99.1 to the Canada
Elections Act, supra, note 180. Provision is also made for cash reimbursements to candidates.
See also Election EapensesAct, s. 10, inserting a new s. 63.1 to the CanadaElections Act.
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In Manitoba, the legislation introduced in 1983 provides for public
funding of political parties to the extent that the parties are entitled
to a reimbursement of up to 50 percent of the maximum permitted
by
expenditure. 2 27 And in Quebec the legislation goes further still 228

providing for the payment of an annual allowance to the parties,

although it is to be noted that unlike either of the other

jurisdictions, this is accompanied by a prohibition on contributions
from any source other than individuals.229 Although Bill 103 has
extended public funding along the Manitoba model, the manner of
calculation is different:
Every registered party that receives at least 15 per cent of the popular vote in any
electoral district and that has filed its statement of income and expenses with the
Commission in accordance with section 43, together with the auditor's report in
accordance with the subsection 41(4), is entitled to be reimbursed by the
Commission for the aggregate amount determined by multiplying 5 cents by the
number of electors entitled to vote, as certified by the Chief Election Officer under
the Election Act, 1984 in each electoral district in which the political party received
such moneys shall be payable to the political
15 per cent of the popular vote
2 3 0 and
party's chief financial officer.

3. Bill 103 has revised and extended the provisions of the
1975 Act. The process of extension is continued in a third major
area - campaign expenditures. As we have seen, the 1975 Act
contained what are sometimes called "segmental" limits,231 in the
sense that restrictions were imposed on the level of advertising
expenses. 232 The new Act now imposes a general limit on election
expenses:
The total campaign expenses incurred by a registered party and any person,
corporation, trade union, unincorporated association or organization acting on behalf
of that party during any campaign period shall not exceed the aggregate amount
determined by multiplying 40 cents by,

227 Elections FinancesAct, supra, note 201, s. 71(3).
228

Elections Act 1984, supra, note 129, s. 358.

229 Ibid., s. 365.
230 Election FinancesAct, supra, note 215, s. 46(6).
231 See Adamany and G. Agree, PoliticalMoney (Baltimore: John Hopkin's University
Press, 1975).
232 Election FinancesReform Act, supra, note 225, s. 38.
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(a) in relation to a general election, the number of electors entitled to vote, as
certified by the Chief Election Officer under the Election Ac 1984, in the electoral
districts in which there is an official candidate of that party.... 2 3 3

Limits are also imposed on the level of permitted expenditures by
candidates with the amount being calculated in accordance with the
following formula:
$2 for each of the first 15,000 electors entitled to vote in the constituency;
$1 for each of the number of electors in excess of 15,000 but less than 25,000; and
$0.25 for each of the number of electors in excess of 25,000.234

In six named constituencies candidates are permitted to spend five
thousand dollars in addition to the sum arrived at on the above
calculation. 23 S This is presumably because of the extra expense
involved in campaigning in what are often remote rural areas.
Bill 103 also differs from the Manitoba statute in the sense
that it does not retain the separate advertising restrictions. It only
imposes a general limit, with the parties being free to spend as much
on advertising as they wish so long as they keep below the statutory
ceiling. As a result, candidates and parties may in fact spend more
on advertising under Bill 103 than was permitted under the 1975
Act. Bill 103 is, however, similar to the Manitoba Act to the extent
that it contains no ban on third party expenditures. This continues
the policy established in 1975: although the original Act imposed
limits on advertising expenses in the campaign period, these applied
only to expenditures by candidates and parties, or by individuals,
corporations, and unions acting on behalf of parties and candidates.
They did not apply to independent expenditures. Indeed, following
the National Citizens' Coalition case,23 6 the Commission on Election
Contributions and Expenses found it necessary to issue a bulletin
advising that in Ontario there was no prohibition similar to the
federal one attacked in that case. In its 1984 Annual Report the
Commission pointed out:

233 Election FinancesAct, supra, note 215, s. 39(1).
234 kbid., s. 39(2).
235 Ibid., s. 39(3).
236 National Citizens Coalition Inc. v. Attorney Generalfor Canada, supra, note 187.
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While limitations are placed on campaign advertising by a political party, a

registered constituency association and a registered candidate, they do not apply to
prohibit or limit advertising by unregistered persons or groups. On the surface, this
appears unfair to the registered political parties and candidates, and this was the
reason for the federal legislation. However, there has been no suggestion that
anyone has made unreasonable use of the privilege, and there has been23no
7 move

by anyone in Ontario to limit third party advertising during an election.

The Commission also pointed out that, although the law in the
Province was at that time "under revision," there was "no proposal
238
to prevent 'third party advertising' during an election campaign."
No such restriction has been introduced, with the result that like the
Manitoba legislation, the Ontario legislation also remains immune
from the challenge raised against the federal statute in the National
Citizen's Coalition case.
The revision of the law on spending limits in Bill 103 may
not however avoid another potential Charterchallenge. Under the
1975 Act, the law discriminated against candidates who had no party
connection. Thus, in the event of a by-election, a limit of fifty cents
per elector was imposed on the political party. In addition, the
constituency association could spend an additional twenty-five cents
per elector.239 In effect, a party candidate could thus have seventyfive cents per elector spent on his or her behalf. So far as
independent candidates are concerned, however, they were permitted
to spend only twenty-five cents per elector. Not surprisingly, this
gave rise to some resentment. In 1986 a by-election took place in
Cochrane North, where one of the unsuccessful candidates, Dr.
Bertrand, was an independent.
Following the election, the
Commission received the following telegram:

237 Tenth Annual Report, supra, note 127 at 10. It was also stated that:

There are some limitations on advertising by third parties and unregistered groups
in Ontario. They do not have any tax benefit on contributions they receive. They
are subject to the Broadcasting Act (Canada) which prohibits advertising on election

day or the day preceding. And if they are, in fact, acting with consent to assist a
registered candidate, association or party, their costs must be included in the total

campaign advertising of those on whose behalf they act.
238 Ibid. at 10.
239 Election Finances Reform Act, supra, note 225, s. 39.
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I wish to protest the unfair unequal and discriminatory treatment of independent

candidates in the Cochrane North by-election under section 39(c) of the Election
Finance Reform Act. I am only allowed to spend on advertising 1/3 of the amount
that the Liberal Party candidates can spend. While this inequality was removed by

the new Act which took effect on July 10 the new Act was explicitly made not
applicable to this by-election. I believe that section 39(c) is contrary to section 15
of the Charter of Rights because all candidates are not treated equally under the
law. I believe therefore that section 39(c) does not limit my spending in this by-

election. I must ask for prompt written confirmation that I am not limited to any
less amounts in my advertising expenses than is Mr Rene Fontaine.

At the time of writing no further steps in the matter had been
taken. Although the objections were raised before the introduction
of Bill 103, they appear equally valid now. Section 39 allows the
party in a by-election to spend up to forty cents per elector in the
constituency, while imposing a limit on candidates' expenses, which
is the same for everyone in the constituency. The party candidates
thus have an advantage in that they may spend an equivalent of
forty cents per elector more than independent candidates. Despite
an implication to the contrary in Dr. Proulx's telegram, the Charter
point which he makes is as valid after the enactment of Bill 103 as
it was before.
V. CONCLUSION: IS FURTHER REFORM POSSIBLE?
If the values of party democracy were to be upheld in
Ontario, it is clear that the 1975 Act was in need of fairly radical
reform to eliminate the impact of the wide differences in the income
and expenditure of the different parties. The effect of the reforms
in Bill 103 is to establish in Ontario "the most comprehensive system
of control and accountability for election and political financing
found in the western world."240 Ontario has effectively embraced
in one statute all the potential methods of control which may be
and which are employed in different jurisdictions throughout the
globe. Thus, there is a comprehensive disclosure requirement; there
are contribution limits; a ceiling is imposed on both candidate and
party campaign expenditures; tax relief is given to stimulate private
240 D.C. MacDonald, "Revised Ontario Act balances election spending" The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail (23 September 1986) A7.
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funding and taxes are used publicly to fund the parties at local and
national level; and the legislation is supervised and enforced by an
independent commission.

The question remains whether Ontario

has reached the limits of law reform in this area. Clearly some
minor changes will be necessary; for example, it may be expedient
to raise the various financial limits on contributors, on expenditures,

and on taxation. It may also be appropriate to amend the powers
of the Commission. 241

Despite criticism of the 1975 Act, the

Commission still does not have the power to initiate prosecutions,
but must report violations to the Attorney-General. It has been
suggested that
[t]he greatest defect in Canadian political finance legislation is the enforcement
procedure. The standard practice is to report contraventions to the AttorneyGeneral, leaving him with the option to prosecute. Some jurisdictions require the
consent of the CEO or Commission before prosecution may be instituted.
The result is a needlessly confusing and drawn out enforcement procedure that is
susceptible to the influence of partisan interests. Every effort should be made to
avoid the possibility of the Attorney-General of the day being influenced by political
prejudice in giving an opinion as to whether prosecution should proceed.
To this end, the best solution would be to allow the Commission to initiate
prosecution proceedings in its own name. Where the legislation stipulates that
consent of the Commission is required, it appears that the Legislature may have
intended to give the Commission unfettered prosecutorial discretion. To prosecute
without reference to the Attorney-General would seem a natural exercise of such
a discretion. Four provinces, Alberta, Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan, have
already given their Commission or CEO powers of investigation in accordance with
the Public Inquiries Act of the province. The power of independent prosecution
is a logical extension. Indeed, this is the course followed by Quebec. There,
by the
proceedings for contraventions against the Act or guidelines are instituted
2 42
Director General of Financing of Political Parties, or by his nominee

But essentially these are changes which assume that the framework

established by Bill 103 is sound. The real question is whether more
fundamental changes are necessary.

241 Election FinancesAct, supra, note 215, s. 4(1)(9). Section 55 requires the consent
of the Commission to any prosecution under the Act.
242 Ontario, Commission on Election Contributions and Expenses, A ComparativeSurvey
of Election Finance Legislation (Toronto: The Commission, 1987) at 46-47.
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A. A Ban on Coporate Contributions?
The most obvious area of concern related to the fact that
corporate contributions are still permitted.
Should corporate
contributions be banned altogether, as in Quebec.243 Such a step
could be justified on three grounds. The first relates to the
legitimacy of such payments. In the liberal form of government, the
legislator's primary duty is to the electorate. 244 As was pointed out
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, "legislators represent
people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests. 245
Corporate financing
encourages and facilitates the representation of interests which are
beyond the immediate duties of the legislator and the party. They
become responsible to groups which clothe them with neither
authority nor legitimacy, but only with money. It is true, of course,
that the limits on corporate contributions will minimize the dangers
of corruption and untoward influence. As long as the money is
available, there will be an inevitable tendency to go after it, if only
because some strategically placed corporations are likely to donate
up to the legal maximum. As a result the business sector as a
whole, if not individual segments within it, will have a
disproportionate influence within the party or upon candidates; the
party or the candidates will need to respond in some way to the
business community if they are to continue to attract support. So
long as a substantial contribution to party funds is made by
institutional interests, there will always be doubts about the ability
of the party in government to take steps which are hostile to these
interests. Indeed, the need to respond to these interests may keep
particular policy options from the table altogether. As the Royal
Commission on Corporate Concentration 246 remarked in a perceptive
Election Act 1984, supra, note 129, s. 258.
244 Much of what follows draws heavily on K.D. Ewing, "Campaign Funding: A Dilemma
for Liberal Democracy," Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Public Law
Workshops (November 1982) [mimeo].
245 377 U.S. 533 at 562 (1964).
246 Canada, Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, Report of the Commission
on Corporate Concentration (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services Canada, 1978).
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passage, "corporate contributions may lead to some sense of
obligation and conflict of interest, as well as suspicion, even though
the companies involved often contribute to two or more rival parties
247
or candidates and neither ask nor expect any quid pro quo."
A second factor which may justify banning corporate
donations relates to the goal of equality. Bill 103 is important in
that for the first time in Ontario the goal of equal electoral
opportunity is formally recognized in legislation. It is done to the
extent that limits are imposed on the spending levels of the parties
and candidates. The goal is undermined, however, to the extent that
no similar restrictions are imposed outside the official campaign
period. One means of responding would be to adopt the New
Brunswick solution of imposing an annual limit on expenditures by
political parties.248 Another means of responding would be to ban
corporate political contributions. As we have seen, a combination
of legal requirements and the internal governing arrangements of the
NDP have effectively prevented any substantial union donations to
the provincial party.
Arguably the demands of equity and parity
of treatment would require that similar controls be imposed on the
corporate financing of the other two parties. More importantly, a
ban on corporate donations would go a long way towards levelling
out the income of the parties. If not for corporate donations, the
annual income of the Conservatives and the NDP would be about
even. In 1983 the total income of the NDP (without institutional
money) would be 86 percent that of the Progressive Conservatives
(without corporate money) rather than 53 percent. 249 The
elimination of corporate donations, which in practice are not
available to the NDP, would then be an indirect way of further
equalizing the political process. There is nothing to suggest, as the
Camp Commission predicted, 250 that the Conservatives would be
bankrupt without corporate support. This may have been true in

247 Ibid. at 343.
248 PoliticalProcess FinancingAct, supra, note 200, s. 50(1).
249 These figures are based on calculations derived from Tenth Annual Report, supra,

note 127 at 29-31.
250 Camp Report, supra, note 6 at 7-8.
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the years immediately following the enactment of the 1975 Act, but
it is hard to see why it would be the case at the time of writing. If
the Conservatives were denied corporate support, it would still leave
them with a higher income than the NDP. It is difficult to see why
this would take the party anywhere near bankruptcy. This does not
deny that drastic economies might have to be made although it is
instructive that until the high-cost election of 1985, the Conservative
government resisted proposals to raise the maximum permitted
corporate donation, on the ground that at the time any such increase
was not needed by the party.251
A third justification for prohibiting corporate donations is
that corporate money is used to finance political parties without any
consultations with shareholders and regardless of whether or not
individual shareholders wish their funds to be used in this way. It
is true that one of the arguments in favour of pressure group
pluralism is that such grounds "have become a fifth estate, the means
by which many individuals contribute to politics." 25 2 However, it is
no part of the liberal vision that individuals should be compelled to
contribute to a party to which they may be opposed:
A man who throughout desires to return of A., and yet wittingly and willingly assists
to return B., by subscription or otherwise, stultifies himself and ranks in point of
intelligence with the man who votes at the poll for both of the opposing candidates.
To constrain a man to such imbecility is both to injure and to insult him, and is,
besides, an injury to the community in preventing freedom of election. Unless
freedom of choice is to be reduced to an absurdity it must extend to the whole
conduct of the elector towards the candidate from beginning to end.2 5 3

It might be argued of course that there is nothing to stop the
member of a company selling his shares and moving to some other
investment. But although superficially attractive, such reasoning is
plainly unconvincing. It is based upon the assumption that there will
always be someone ready to buy the shares at the price paid by the
investor. In many cases that will probably not be difficult, but
conceivably it need not always be so, particularly in times of
251 Information provided to the author by the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario.
252 j.Stewart, British Pressure Groups: Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958) at 244.
253 AmalgamatedSociety of Railway Servantsv. Osborne, [1909] 1 Ch. 163 at 195 (Farwell
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recession. But even if such an option is available, "this could require
a shareholder who wishes to avoid making a political contribution
being forced to make a decision which, on commercial grounds, he
may believe to be mistaken. Nor is such a choice available to a
member of a pension fund which decides to purchase shares in a
company making political donations."254 Further, the shareholder's
remedy is not available to the employee of a donating company.
The company is a structure in which the position of the employee
demands consideration: "The coming of age of democracy in our
society is a process that inevitably affects the whole of people's lives;
it cannot be excluded from the workplace." 255 Yet as things
presently stand in Canada, however, company employees are required
to hold back and watch as the profits which they helped to create
go to finance a political party to which they may be opposed.
B. The Charteras a Limit to FurtherRefonn
There are thus three considerations which suggest that the
work of the legislature is not yet completed. On the other hand, it
may well be counter-productive to go any further. While further
reform must be justified in practice, it is effectively constrained both
by practical considerations and by the limits imposed by the Charter.
If corporate donations were banned, it does not follow that
corporate money would be removed from the political system. It is
likely that corporate money would be rerouted; it would go to the
parties, but by less direct methods. The history of attempts to ban
corporate donations in both Canada and the United States have
been marked by failure. 256 This, however, is not a persuasive
argument. It is unconvincing to argue that because the policing of
controls may be difficult, no steps should therefore be taken. But
there is a second and more weighty consideration. Even if a ban

254 Hansard Society for Parliamentary Government, Payingfor Politics (London: Cassell,

1981) at 29.
255 U.K., "Report of the Committee on Industrial Democracy" Cmnd. 6706 in Sessional
Papers (1977-78) vol. 21, 22.
256 See supra, note 51.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 27 NO. I

was made effective, corporate money would be redirected; rather
than donate directly to the political parties, the corporations would
engage in independent expenditures on behalf of the parties and
candidates. The result would be just the same, and perhaps even
worse, the danger being the active involvement in Canada of high
profile political action committees promoting a wide range of
corporate interest. So if a ban on corporate political contributions
was to be effective, it would have to be accompanied ,by a similar
ban on corporate political expenditures. Otherwise the political
process would be distorted through contests between high-spending
special interest groups in which parties, candidates, and electors
would be by-standers.
It is unlikely, however, that such a measure could successfully
be introduced in Canada. 257 Evidence from both the United States
and Canada suggests that the arguments considered above are
unlikely to persuade the court that corporate contributions are
unjustified in a democracy. It is clear, despite the rhetoric in
Reynolds v. Sims,258 that the courts have no doubts about the
legitimacy of corporate involvement in the political process. The
leading case is perhaps First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,2 5 9
where Massachusetts sought to prohibit corporations from taking
part in state referenda unless the subject matter materially affected
the business of the corporation. The question for the court was
"whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives this proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to
protection. 260 In answering in the negative, Mr. Justice Powell, for
the majority, wrote:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State
could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to
decision-making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes

257 The Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, supra, note 189, provides by s. 33(1)

that "Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament
or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate

notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter."
258 Supra, note 245.
259 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
2 60

Ibid. at 778.
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from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in
terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
26 1
of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.

Corporate political influence is thus clothed with the legitimacy of
the constitution, and the fact that its "advocacy may persuade the
rights
electorate is [no] reason to suppress it.'"262 The constitutional
263
Canada.
in
recognized
been
also
have
of corporations
Not only do corporations have the right to participate in the
political process, it also seems that the legislative branch has only a
limited authority under constitutional government to intervene to
regulate that participation. While it is true that the goal of equal
access has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
(F.C.C.),26 this was admittedly an exceptional case. The court
upheld, in the face of a First Amendment challenge, the fairness
doctrine of the F.C.C., which gave a right to reply to targets in
political debate. In speaking for the majority, Mr Justice White said
that the right of free speech of a broadcaster does not include a
right to snuff out the free speech of others and that "it is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than countenance monopolization." 265 Similar arguments have not,
however, had any impact in the area of political contributions and
expenditures. It is true that in Buckley v. Valeo,266 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of contribution limits as
a means of preventing the danger of corruption. It was not,
however, willing to accept limits on expenditures by third party
interest groups, a decision subsequently followed in Federal Election

261 Ibid. at 777.
262 Ibid. at 790.
2 63

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321.

264 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
265 Ibid. at 390.
266 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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Commission v. National Conservative PAC.267 In Buckley the
legislation contained three major spending limits. The first was a
limit of $1,000 on so-called independent expenditures, that is,
expenditures, for example, by individuals, corporations, or unions
"relative to a clearly identified candidate;" second, a restriction on
the amount of private resources which candidates could use to
finance their campaign; and third, a total spending ceiling on
candidates for election to federal office. In reaching this decision
the court was strongly influenced by First Amendment considerations
and was concerned that the limits heavily burdened First Amendment
expression. The court was not persuaded that the controls were
necessary to equalize the relative ability of individuals and groups to
influence the outcome of elections. In the case of the independent
expenditures the court held that
the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed to secure "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources," and "to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired
by the people"
... The First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free
expression cannot properly be
made to depend on a person's financial ability to
68
engage in public discussion.

While in the case of the overall spending limits by candidates the
court said:
on the size of outside contributions, the financial resources available to a candidate's
campaign, like the number of volunteers recruited, will normally vary with the size
and intensity of the candidate's support. There is nothing invidious, improper, or
unhealthy in permitting
such funds to be spent to carry the candidate's message
2 69
to the electorate.

So the goal of equality of opportunity between rival groups
was not enough to justify the restrictions. If such considerations fail
to persuade the court to maintain limits on corporate spending,
much less likely are they to persuade the court to accept a ban on
267 84 L Ed. 2d. 455 (1985).

268 Supra, note 266 at 48-49.
269 Ibid. at 56.
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corporate spending.
It is thus clear from the American
jurisprudence that freedom of expression transcends equality of
electoral opportunity. It is true, however, that the position in
Canada is much less equivocal. Arguably the National Citizens'
Coalition case turned on the evidence rather than the principle of
equality which the government was seeking to defend. As a result,
it does not follow that Buckley would be followed here, and it may
be that better and fuller evidence would lead to a much different
result in the Canadian courts. In any event, it has to be said that
the banning of corporate contributions and expenditures as a means
of promoting equality of electoral opportunity in Ontario is at best
arguable. In 1984 the published information shows
i.
ii.
iii.

the total income (headquarters and riding associations) of the NDP was
only 53% that of the Conservatives;
the total income of the OLP was only 24% that of the Conservatives;
2 70
the total income of the OLP was only 44% that of the NDP.

If, however, the corporate and trade union contributions were
prohibited, this would in fact lead to an equalization between the
NDP and the Conservatives. The NDP income would then be as much
as 80 percent that of the Conservatives. But on the other hand, it
would extend the gulf between Liberals and the NDP mainly because
the Liberals raise so little money from individual donors. Thus, to
prohibit corporate donations would lead to a situation (on the basis
of 1985 figures) whereby the central income of the oLP was only 24
percent that of the Conservatives and 30 percent that of the
NDP.

271

Could restrictions be justified under the Charter to prevent
the forced association of shareholders with political causes to which
they are opposed? Some weight is lent to this argument by the
decision in Lavigne v. O.P.S.E.U.272 where it was held that trade
union members in public employment cannot be compelled to pay
agency fees which will then be used for political purposes. This is

270 Figures derived from information provided in Eleventh Annual Report, supra, note

36 at 17-19.
271 ibid.
272 Unreported at the time of writing.
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because in situations where union security arrangements operate, the
member will have no right to withdraw from the union,2 73 and, as
a result, the court held that an arrangement must be devised
whereby the individual in question must be relieved of those
proportions of union dues which are not used to finance collective
bargaining expenditures. 274 This issue was raised in Bellotti, but was
rejected because
[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the procedures of corporate
democracy, whether their corporation should engage in debate on public issues.
Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon
protective provisions in the corporation's charter 7 5 shareholders normally are
presumed competent to protect their own interests.2

The majority distinguished the labour union cases (Lavigne is
parallelled by Street276 and Abood 277 in the United States) on the
ground that in the corporation cases "no shareholder has been
'compelled' to contribute anything. The shareholder invests in a
corporation of his own volition and is free to withdraw his
investment at any time and for any reason."278 This rather simplistic
reasoning did not, however, satisfy Mr. Justice White who, in dissent,
said
[i]t is no answer to respond, as the court does, that the dissenting "shareholder ...
is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason." The employees
in Street and Abood were also free to seek other jobs where they would not be
compelled to finance causes with which they disagreed, but we held in Abood that

273 Under the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228, employers and trade unions
are able to negotiate union security arrangements that require membership of the union as
a condition of employment (s. 46(1)(a)). It is to be noted, however, that no trade union shall
require the employer to discharge an employee because he has been excluded or expelled from
the union for the reason that the member was a member of another trade union; engaged in
activity against the trade union; engaged in reasonable dissent within the trade union;
discriminated against by the union in the application of its membership rules; or refused to
pay initiation fees, dues or other assessments to the union which are unreasonable (s. 46(2)).
274 For an account of the impact of earlier developments in the U.S.A., see Adamany
and Agree, supra, note 231.
275 FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) at 794-95.
276 InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
277

Abood v. Detroit School Board, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).

278 FirstNational Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra, note 275 at 794, n. 34.

1989]

The Fundingof PoliticalParties

91

First Amendment rights could not be so burdened. Clearly the state has a strong
interest in assuring that its citizens are not forced to choose between supporting the
views with which they disagree and passing up investment
propagation of
2 79
opportunities.

But even if such an argument were to succeed and unions and
corporations were thus treated equally, it does not follow that a

complete ban on corporate contributions could be justified on this
ground. Such a ban is likely to fail on the ground that it is overbroad. The union in Lavigne was not disabled from participating in
political activity; it was required to do so in a manner which would
not compromise the right to freedom of association of people like

Lavigne. A similar result in the corporate context would not prevent
corporations from creating "political action committees," financed by
the "voluntary" contributions of shareholders and employees.
Although this is a development which in the United States has been
approved by the Supreme Court, 280 it has also been strongly
criticized.

279 Ibid. Mr. Justice White also said at 806:
Although it is arguable that corporations make such expenditures because their
managers believe that it is in the corporations' economic interest to do so, there is
no basis whatsoever for concluding that these views are expressive of the
heterogenous beliefs of their shareholders whose convictions on many political issues
are undoubtedly shaped by considerations other than a desire to endorse any
electoral or ideological cause which would tend to increase the value of a particular
corporate investment. This is particularly true where, as in this case, whatever the
belief of the corporate managers may be, they have not been able to demonstrate
that the issue involved has any material connection with the corporate business.
Thus when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political candidate this does
not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its shareholders in the way that
expenditures from them as individuals would.
280

FederalElection Commission v. National Conservative P.A.C, supra, note 267 at 468.

